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PARENS PATRIAE AND THE STATES' 
HISTORIC POLICE POWER 
Margaret S. Thomas* 
ABSTRACT 
Class actions have long been contracting as procedural vehicles in mass 
tort litigation. At the same time, parens patriae actions brought by state 
attorneys general for injuries to their states' citizenry have been expanding. 
This form of public dispute has emerged as a full-fledged alternative form 
of aggregate litigation in mass torts. The use of this public alternative is 
already widespread in consumer, antitrust, environmental, and health law 
cases. 
Despite the widespread use of parens patriae litigation by states, the 
source of the power to sue in this way is vague and ill-defined. Courts have 
struggled to articulate and explain the source and scope of the state's power 
to bring mass tort suits for injuries to the state's populace, sometimes reach-
ing seemingly contradictory results. 
Although the use of parens patriae power in mass tort litigation has been 
both praised and criticized by complex litigation scholars, commentators 
have largely overlooked the historical and constitutional functional role of 
parens patriae litigation. This Article fills that gap by examining the states' 
parens patriae power from the Framing Era to the modern era in order to 
excavate the doctrine's historical roots and purpose in our constitutional 
structure. It debunks the false history used by modern courts to justify the 
doctrine's existence, suggesting courts have relied on a faulty foundation to 
expand the doctrine. In so doing, this Article makes space for a new foun-
dation for parens patriae litigation rooted in the historic police powers of 
the states. 
This Article argues that the historic police powers of the states are inex-
tricable from parens patriae power. Modern mass tort litigation brought by 
states is thus deeply connected to federalism in a way that traditional class 
actions are not. 
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search support for this project. I am grateful for helpful comments from Paul Baier, 
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INTRODUCTION 
LASS actions have been waning in importance as procedural ve-
hicles in mass torts for many years.' This purported demise of 
class actions has long been heralded by scholars.2 Indeed, the di-
minishing presence of class actions in the mass tort litigation landscape 
has been a focus of academic commentary since at least the early 1990s, 3 
and the trend appears to have accelerated following recent Supreme 
Court precedent imposing higher barriers to certification of class actions 
4 in federal courts.
Complex litigation scholarship has begun to focus on what will replace 
class actions in mass tort litigation. Class actions resolve mass tort dis-
putes by binding absent class members through representative litigation. 5 
Other forms of aggregation can also accomplish this resolution through 
different means. For example, multidistrict litigation and private claims 
facilities have emerged as increasingly important alternatives to class ac-
tions.6 One of the most vibrant alternatives appears to be parens patriae 
actions: civil suits brought by state attorneys general against mass 
tortfeasors for injuries to the states' citizenry. 7 In fact, such state suits 
have been experiencing a period of ascendance and expansion. 8 
1. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the 
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHi. L. REV. 623, 658 (2012) (describing 
class actions as being "on the ropes"); Jeremy Hays, The Quasi-Class Action Model for 
Limiting Attorneys' Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 589, 601 
(2012) (discussing the waning utility of class actions under Rule 23 and the imperfect na-
ture of MDL as a replacement); Deborah R. Hensler, Goldilocks and the Class Action, 126 
HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 56 (2012) ("Mass tort class actions have virtually disappeared .... ); 
Margaret S. Thomas, Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63 
EMORY L.J. 1339, 1346 & n.37 (2014). 
2. See, e.g., Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV. Li-
TrG. 495, 500 (1991) (applauding judicial consolidation of related suits); Michael A. Perino, 
Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass 
Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85, 102 (1997); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: 
The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 
425-27 (2005); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 
828-29 (2013). 
3. See Silver, supra note 2, at 500 (observing in the early 1990s that it was already true 
that narrow interpretation of class action rules made it difficult for district judges "to craft 
tort class actions that survive review"). 
4. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (201.1) (holding that 
"claims for individualized relief (like the backpay at issue here) do not satisfy [] Rule 
[23(b)(2)]."); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013). 
5. See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, Disaggregative Mechanisms: Mass Claims Resolution With-
out Class Actions, 63 EMOizY L.J. 1253, 1272 (2014) (discussing the increasing importance 
of private claims facilities); Morphing Case Boundaries, supra note 1, at 1341 (discussing 
multidistrict litigation's role in mass tort litigation). 
6. See, e.g., John E. Kennedy, Digging for the Missing Link, 41 VANO. L. REV. 1089, 
1091 (1988) (reviewing STEPIHEN C. YIAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO 
THE MODERN CLASS ACION (New Haven and Yale University Press 1987)). 
7. See Prentiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights, 100 U. 
MINN. L. Rwv. 2313, 2327-29 (2016). 
8. See id. (describing consumer protection actions for the past fifteen years); Jack 
Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L REV. 1847, 1847, 1858 (2000). For a defini-
tion of "mass tort," see Morphing Case Boundaries, supra note 1, at 1349 n.48 (explaining 
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Modern parens patriae actions generally involve a state (or sometimes 
several states suing together) bringing claims that belong exclusively to 
the state-or sometimes, bringing claims in a representative capacity be-
longing to its citizens.9 States usually (but not always) base their claims 
on state or federal statutory authority.10 Sometimes states invoke a com-
mon-law form of parens patriae power based solely on their own sover-
eign interests.11 The common thread is that the state itself is the plaintiff, 
asserting a guardianship role to protect itself and its citizens from alleged 
harm. Some scholars observe that through these actions, states have be-
come the primary governmental enforcers of deceptive advertising and 
antitrust laws.12 
In the mid-1990s, use of parens patriae powers by state attorneys gen-
eral accelerated dramatically, with such suits becoming full-fledged alter-
natives to traditional class actions-with the successful, multibillion 
dollar state litigation against the tobacco industry reflecting the full po-
tential of such litigation. 13 Prior to that era, parens patriae suits had been 
lightly utilized in antitrust and environmental pollution suits.1 4 With class 
actions fading in mass tort litigation, suits brought by states on behalf of 
citizens are now an increasingly prominent feature of a wide variety of 
complex litigation. 
Parens patriae cases are already distributing massive amounts of 
money to plaintiffs in mass tort case settlements-sums that previously 
would have been the subject of class actions. An example can be found in 
the widely publicized settlement by three large book publishers with state 
attorneys general over electronic book pricing in 2013, in which publish-
that the concept of "mass torts" generally "encompass[es] situations where many people 
are injured either from a single accident or event, or use of or exposure to the same prod-
uct, and each has a claim for individual damages"). 
9. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative 
Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. Riv. 486, 495-97 (2012) (observing state 
and federal statutes granting attorneys general authority to recover damages for state citi-
zens and state attorneys general using parens patriae actions to seek damages and other 
monetary remedies on behalf of their citizens); Colin Provost, An Integrated Model of U.S. 
State Attorney General Behavior in Multi-State Litigation, 10 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 1, 1-2 
(2010) ("While the overall number of [parens patriae] lawsuits as well as the number of 
states participating has increased over time, some states are much more active participants 
than others .... ") (internal citation omitted). 
10. Cox, supra note 7, at 2324. 
11. Cox, supra note 7, at 2327-29. 
12. Provost, supra note 9, at 1. 
13. Ratliff, supra note 8, at 1847 ("The success of the tobacco litigation has stimulated 
new initiatives respecting guns, lead paint, and, most recently, health maintenance organi-
zations.") (citations omitted); see also Richard P. leyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State At-
torney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 Tul. 
L. RFzv. 1859, 1883 (2000); William H. Pryor, Jr., A Comparison of Abuses and Reforms of 
Class Actions and Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 Tui. L. Rrv. 1885, 1902-03 (2000). 
14. See Michael Malina & Michael D. Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Dam-
ages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U. L. Rvv. 193, 193-95 (1970) (discussing an in-
crease in the assertion of antitrust claims by state governments using parens patriae power 
and observing that prior to 1970, only one decision reflected the use of that power in an 
antitrust case); see also infra notes 207-223 and accompanying text (discussing environ-
mental cases). 
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ers paid over $166 million to settle the claims. 15 The same litigation also 
produced roughly $400 million in liability for Apple.' 6 The settlement 
money largely flowed back to consumers, in the form of credits sent by 
retailers.1 7 Similarly, forty-three states recently reached a partial settle-
ment with Volkswagen worth $603 million over alleged faulty emissions 
software in its automobiles.' 8 Meanwhile, three states are filing separate 
suits of their own.19 
Parens patriae is no longer an "up and coming" alternative to class 
actions. It has already emerged as a fully viable, mature, and effective 
alternative form of mass tort litigation, capable of resolving multi-state, 
nine-figure complex claims. Despite this role, the states' parens patriae 
powers have received little attention from the U.S. Supreme Court in re-
cent years, at least compared to class actions. 
In 2014, the Supreme Court finally seemed to acknowledge the role of 
the states in mass torts in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Cor-
poration,20 a decision that seems likely to accelerate the rise of parens 
patriae suits as an alternative to class actions. This decision clarified that 
these state-brought mass tort actions are not removable to federal court 
under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) because they are not class 
actions. They also are not subject to the array of procedural hurdles fed-
eral courts have developed as obstacles to class certification using Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23. The decision implicitly blesses litigating 
parens patriae mass tort suits in state courts, 21 using state procedural 
rules, even though class actions involving the same torts would be remov-
able to federal court under CAFA and constrained by Rule 23's rigorous 
15. See Andrew Albanese, Publishers Have Paid $166 Million to Settle E-Book Claims, 
PUBLISHERS WKLY (Jul. 24, 2013), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/digital/ 
content-and-e-books/artice/5841 2-publishers-have-paid-166-million-to-settle-e-book-
claims.html [https://perma.cc/2QL7-QYLB]. 
16. See James R. Hood, Appeals court upholds $400 million e-book price-fixing settle-
ment with Apple, CONSUMER AFFAIRS, https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/appeals-
court-upholds-400-million-e-book-price-fixing-settlement-with-apple-063015.html [https:// 
perma.cc/4LGY-G935]. 
17. Id. 
18. David Shepardson, Three U.S. States Plan Lawsuits over Volkswagen Diesel Pollu-
tion, REUTERS (July 18, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen-emissions-id 
USKCNOZY2JU [https://perma.cc/7CND-J7LF]. 
19. See Complaint, Maryland Dep't of Env't v. Volkswagen, No. 24-C-16-004114 (Md. 
Cir. Ct. July 19, 2016); Complaint, Massachusetts v. Volkswagen, No. 16-2266D (Mass. 
Super. July 19, 2016); Complaint, New York v. Volkswagen, No. 9040212016 (N.Y. Sup. 
July 19, 2016). 
20. See 134 S. Ct. 736, 739 (2014) (holding that parens patriae actions (i.e., where the 
state is the plaintiff) are not procedurally equivalent to class actions, under the Class Ac-
tion Fairness Act, despite some surface similarities). 
21. See, e.g., Paul Thibodeaux & Danny Dysart, Supreme Court's CAFA Decision 
Changes Law in Fifth Circuit, A.B.A. Src. LIT., http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/com-
mittees/pretria/articles/spring20l4-0614-supreme-courts-cafa-decision-changes-aw-fifth-
circuit.html [https://perma.cc/AKL4-E9T7] ("While the practical result of Hood is that 
state parens patriae actions are likely no longer subject to CAFA mass-action removal, a 
broader question is whether Hood will encourage the filing of parens patriae actions in 
place of traditional Rule 23 class actions, which have been increasingly difficult to 
certify."). 
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requirements for class certification. In other words, parens patriae litiga-
tion can evade virtually all of the class action hurdles that have been er-
ected by Congress and the Supreme Court. 
Parens patriae litigation is already a prominent feature in the legal 
landscape of consumer, antitrust, environmental, and health law disputes. 
However, the doctrine's modern contours have long been vague and ill-
defined, particularly in regard to states raising claims for injuries to their 
citizens. By the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court had 
virtually given up the task of defining the doctrine's contours and simply 
declared the meaning of parens patriae "[was] murky."'22 Despite its 
amorphousness, the doctrine's modern incarnation appears to be firmly 
rooted in the pragmatic expansion of aggregate litigation in the mid-
twentieth century, developing independently of Rule 23. 
The "murkiness" of parens patriae power has sometimes resulted in a 
judicial struggle to articulate and explain when the state has authority to 
bring mass tort suits for injuries to the state's residents. Although pur-
porting to trace the concept of parens patriae back to the "royal preroga-
tive" of the English Crown at common law,23 the Supreme Court has 
admitted that the venerable English royal prerogative "has relatively lit-
tle to do with the concept of parens patriae standing that has developed in 
American law."'24 Those historical roots, however, continue to be invoked 
in judicial opinions to legitimize the state power to sue in this capacity. 
Historical skepticism of the doctrine led critics to call the parens pa-
triae powers in mass torts "disturbing ' 25 and "loopy."'26 Meanwhile, use 
of these powers has been both praised for its effectiveness and efficiency 
in comparison to class actions27 and critiqued for its potential to create 
conflicts of interest in the state's representation of citizens, leading to in-
2
adequate representation. 8 
Modern academic literature on parens patriae has primarily focused on 
its efficiency and effectiveness in achieving the goals of complex litiga-
tion, by comparing parens patriae cases to class actions. Several scholars 
have carefully evaluated the policy costs and benefits associated with a 
robust parens patriae authority, reaching different conclusions about the 
value of such litigation in the mass tort context. 29 This debate has largely 
22. See Ratliff, supra note 8, at 1850-51, 1851 n.18 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 
(1967)). 
23. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 
600 (1982). 
24. Id. 
25. Pryor, supra note 13, at 1913. 
26. Ratliff, supra note 8, at 1851. 
27. Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens 
Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 Tui. L. Ri'v. 1919, 1939 (2000). 
28. Lemos, supra note 9, at 492. 
29. For examples of recent criticism of robust parens patriae authority as lacking in 
adequate procedural protections for public claims, see Lemos, supra note 9, at 542; Michael 
D. Sant'Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 Cot UM. L. 
RFv. 1992, 1.995-96 (2012); Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attor-
neys General and Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. Rivv. 913, 914-16 (2008). 
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overlooked the structural role of parens patriae cases in our constitu-
tional system-a role that fundamentally distinguishes the parens patriae 
power from any other type of complex litigation. This Article contends 
the policy debate comparing parens patriae to class actions ignores the 
special role of the parens patriae power in our constitutional system-a 
role that reflects different values and a different purpose than Rule 23's 
class actions. 
This Article poses two foundational questions regarding the parens pa-
triae doctrine: (1) why does it exist in the American legal system at all, 
and (2) what, if any, constitutional purpose does it serve? Through these 
questions, this Article excavates the conceptual foundations of the doc-
trine's application in complex litigation and demonstrates the doctrine's 
deep, historical roots in constitutional federalism, particularly in the 
structural constitutional understanding of the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries. 
This Article demonstrates that the modern parens patriae doctrine is a 
feature of American federalism. Liberated from the English common law 
pedigree and mythological royal roots, the doctrine's American constitu-
tional contours become clearer, and its limits are revealed as an expres-
sion of the state's historic police powers. Moreover, modern statutory 
applications of the doctrine arguably comport with Framing-era under-
standings of sovereign power. Focusing on the relationship between the 
parens patriae and the state's historic police powers illuminates the defi-
ciency with modern policy debate that compares the power to Rule 23. 
Despite the surface similarities, class actions under Rule 23 and parens 
patriae actions by state attorneys general rely on different structural val-
ues and serve different purposes. 
The Supreme Court apparently views the class certification device 
under Rule 23 as a mere procedural joinder device. 30 By contrast, the 
parens patriae power of states to sue in mass tort actions is a feature of 
federalism. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes the policy de-
bate regarding modern parens patriae suits, in which scholars view parens 
patriae through the lens of class actions in complex litigation. The Article 
then proceeds to show why that lens offers an incomplete understanding 
of parens patriae. 
For examples of defenses of parens patriae's utility as an efficient, effective form of mass 
litigation, see Gilles & Friedman, supra note 1, at 630, 660; Brunet, supra note 27, at 
1932-34, 1936; Cox, supra note 8, at 2330-31. 
30. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Ass'ns v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010) 
(Scalia, J., plurality) (describing Rule 23 as "a species" of "traditional joinder" because it 
"merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of 
in separate suits"). The modern form of the class action device was largely created by the 
1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, though earlier forms of class 
actions had existed even under the old Equity Rules. See, e.g., Tom Ford, The History and 
Development of Old Rule 23 and the Development of the Amended Rule 23, 32 ANTITRUST 
L. J. 254, 254-55, 258-62 (1966). 
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Part II examines the justifications for parens patriae's application in 
America, including the historical narratives regarding the English roots of 
the modern parens patriae doctrine. The oldest, and most persistent of 
these narratives, is dubbed her "the Sovereignty Transference theory," 
which posits that, at the time of the American Revolution, the new states 
received the prerogatives of the English Crown. This Article reconstructs 
the history of the doctrine from the Framing Era and identifies historical 
errors embedded in its development. It identifies historical problems with 
this theory, based on the understandings of the Framing generation and 
argues that the Sovereignty Transference theory is untenable. The second 
possible historical justification for parens patriae is dubbed "the Univer-
sal Sovereignty theory," under which the parens patriae powers asserted 
by the states are deemed to be inherent, universal powers that any func-
tioning state must possess. This theory emerged at the same time as fed-
eral general common law in other areas in the mid-nineteenth century 
and reflects identical reasoning. It derives general, universal principles 
and imputes them onto the states to create a common law supervisory 
power. This Article argues that this federal theory of parens patriae did 
not survive the Supreme Court's abolition of federal common law in 
1938,31 and it cannot offer a solid modern foundation to explain robust 
state guardianship powers in mass tort ligation. 
Part III shows that two variants of these theories invoked by the Su-
preme Court to justify parens patriae are an inadequate foundation for 
the expansive modern use of the doctrine. It traces the historical expan-
sion of state use of parens patriae power and argues that modern confu-
sion about the doctrine flows from the lack of coherence in the doctrine's 
foundation. None of the classic justifications for parens patriae's exis-
tence in America can carry the load of the modern application of the 
doctrine. 
In Part IV, this Article offers a different justification for parens patriae 
power that situates the modern doctrine within our constitutional system. 
It demonstrates that evolving understandings of the power have reflected 
then-current contours of the states' historic police powers. Indeed, the 
power expanded in the early twentieth century in tandem with the scope 
of the states' police powers. This Article thus situates parens patriae as a 
reflection of the states' historic police powers in our constitutional sys-
tem. This understanding better explains the outcomes of cases and liber-
ates them from false historical frameworks that only cause confusion. 
I. THE MODERN PARENS PATRIAE CONTROVERSY 
A robust academic literature is developing that evaluates the merit of 
parens patriae as a method of litigating mass torts. This literature focuses 
on parens patriae as an alternative to, or replacement for, class actions. 
31. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
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For this reason, it emphasizes the same values often used to evaluate the 
utility of class actions. 
Several commentators have emphasized the pragmatic benefits of 
parens patriae actions in the mass tort context. Professor Gilles and Mr. 
Friedman have called for greater use of parens patriae powers to fill the 
void created by the demise of class actions. 32 They emphasize the effi-
ciency benefits and effectiveness of parens patriae as an alternative pro-
cedural vehicle. Professor Brunet has also carefully outlined the 
efficiency benefits flowing from state representation of citizens in dam-
ages class actions, including improved overall effectiveness that remedies 
some of the classic problems with class actions.33 These scholarly ap-
proaches treat parens patriae as a substitute procedural vehicle for 
aggregation. 
In contrast, Professor Lemos has critiqued the value of representative 
suits brought by states because they mimic class actions. She suggested 
that a long-standing, influential law-and-economics critique of private 
class actions could potentially apply with equal force when states re-
present their own citizens: namely possible conflicts of interest,34 lack of 
client monitoring and control,35 and incentives to settle cases too 
cheaply. 36 She also claimed that these problems can create due process 
concerns when states assert mass-tort claims on behalf of their citizens 
where the state action can preclude future individual claims that may not 
have been adequately represented by the state.37 The force of this cri-
tique militates in favor of greater procedural regulation of them, probably 
along the lines of the closer scrutiny that class actions have experienced. 
In other words, it tends to suggest that Rule 23's complexity should be 
grafted onto parens patriae actions. 
Professor Cox has recently responded by showing the concerns raised 
in academic critics of parens patriae are not borne out in practice and that 
the critique overstates the risk of preclusion of private claims.38 He 
pointed to copious precedent suggesting parens patriae litigation gener-
32. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 1, at 630, 660 ("In our view, state attorneys gen-
eral-alone among public enforcers-have the ability to fill the void left by class actions, 
primarily through expanded use of the parens patriae powers ..... 
33. Brunet, supra note 27, at 1932-34, 1936. 
34. Lemos, supra note 9, at 512-13. 
35. Id. at 518-22. 
36. Id. at 522-29. 
37. Id. at 540-41; accord Verity Winship, Policing Compensatory Relief in Agency Set-
tlements, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 551, 552 (2013); Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 
11.4 Coi UM. L. RjEV. 1, 45 (2014). 
38. Cox, supra note 8, at 2336-37 ("The case law is reasonably clear that public com-
pensation generally does not result in preclusion of private claims for monetary relief. Ac-
cordingly, concerns about Due Process protections for recipients are misplaced."); id. at 
2344-45 ("Because no judicial decision holds that preclusion of private monetary relief 
claims follows public compensation from a state attorney general action without procedu-
ral protections similar to a class action, the Lemos article is plainly wrong about the pre-
vailing view of courts, especially when that assertion is directly contrary to substantial case 
law and practice patterns."); id. at 2360 ("[U]rging class action procedures only as to public 
compensation misconstrues the purpose and operation of public enforcement."). 
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ally does not preclude later claims for monetary damages by private 
plaintiffs. 39 Moreover, it would seem that any hypothetical excessive pre-
clusion issues (allegedly flowing from citizens potentially losing claims 
settled too cheaply by states) would be a matter of fine-tuning preclusion 
doctrine to preserve those claims, and not an inherent defect of parens 
patriae doctrine itself. 
Professor Gifford also observed that the settlements created by such 
litigation, targeting entire industries, act as a form of regulation, without 
the involvement of any legislature-creating separation of powers con-
cerns at the state governmental level.40 This contribution is helpful be-
cause it emphasizes state governmental values in the critique. 
Critiques and defenses largely focus on the practical effects of the doc-
trine's application in the mass tort context tend to evaluate parens patriae 
litigation by the same metrics used to measure the effectiveness of repre-
sentative suits under Rule 23. These contributions leave the structural ra-
tionale for parens patriae in American federalism submerged in the 
debate. 
The murky historical foundation underlying the doctrine has not been 
challenged or examined in these critiques or defenses of the modern ap-
plication of the doctrine. Despite the scholarly division about doctrinal 
contours and utility, there is little doubt that the doctrine is well en-
trenched and expanding. These scholars fall into two camps: one recom-
mends putting the brakes on that expansion, and the other advocates for 
continuing the expansion-largely for instrumental reasons. 
This Article seeks to move beyond those instrumental reasons (such as 
efficiency and accuracy), to focus instead on the structural role parens 
patriae actions play in our federal system. Part II thus turns to the history 
and purpose of state parens patriae power as an independent doctrine, 
with a different systemic function than Rule 23 aggregation. 
I. AMERICAN SOURCES OF PARENS PATRIAE POWER 
Two theories of parens patriae power dominate the Supreme Court's 
precedent. The first, and by far the most important, posits that states in-
herited the English king's prerogatives to act as "guardian of the realm" 
at the time of the American Revolution, and that these royal prerogatives 
are the foundation for state parens patriae power. This Part argues both 
premises are false: the states neither inherited royal prerogatives in the 
manner described in the cases nor were those prerogatives the real source 
of American parens patriae power. 
This false theory of the doctrine's origin can be described as the "Sov-
ereignty Transference" theory of parens patriae. Part II.A explores the 
rise of the Sovereignty Transference theory in American jurisprudence 
39. See Cox, supra note 8, at 2337-39; see also Hensler, supra note 1, at 58-59 (dis-
agreeing with Lemos). 
40. See Gifford, supra note 29, at 920, 930. 
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and contrasts it with nature of the king's power in England at the time of 
the American Revolution, and the conceptual problems with purported 
transference. It concludes that transference of any power from the En-
glish king to the states after the American Revolution was complicated by 
the existence of English statutory authority constraining the Crown's 
guardianship power. States received and repealed this statute inconsis-
tently. In fact, cases from the Framing Era showed courts at that time 
were acutely aware of the problem such statutory reception posed. 
Part II.B examines a second theory of parens patriae that emerged in 
the mid-nineteenth century. This second theory asserts that the power 
was a reflection of inherent sovereignty. This Article dubs this the "Uni-
versal Sovereignty" theory of parens patriae, based on its claim that the 
power reflects some feature of universal governance. This theory 
emerged through the vehicle of general common law in an era when fed-
eral courts were still in the business of deriving such law from general 
principles. This theory was rarely invoked, but it seems to have vanished 
after the Supreme Court obliterated the federal general law. 
A. THE SOVEREIGNTY TRANSFERENCE THEORY OF 
PARENS PATRIAE POWER 
1. The King as Guardian of the Realm 
The parens patriae doctrine in America is commonly traced to the role 
of English Crown as a guardian of realm.41 Under this view, the power 
allegedly derived from the king's duty "to take care of his subjects as are 
legally unable" to care for themselves. 42 This power reportedly encom-
passed legally protecting subjects lacking mental capacity (including chil-
dren and those afflicted by mental infirmity), as well as the oversight of 
charitable trusts. 43 The lord chancellor, as "keeper of the sovereign's con-
science," held this power in the king's name and delegated it to English 
44 
chancery. 
The notion of the royal prerogative as the source of parens patriae 
power in America appears to be rooted in Blackstone's Commentaries on 
the Laws of England, describing the king as "the general guardian of all 
infants, idiots, and lunatics; and has the general superintendence of all 
charitable uses in the kingdom. And all this over and above the vast and 
extensive jurisdiction which he exercises in his judicial capacity in the 
court of chancery."' 45 This passage from Blackstone's influential 18th-cen-
41. See, e.g., Ratliff, supra note 13, at 1850; George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of 
Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 896 (1976) (dis-
cussing Blackstone's view of the power). 
42. Curtis, supra note 41, at 896 (quoting J. CHIrrY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE 
PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 155 (1820)). 
43. Curtis, supra note 41, at 896 & n.5. 
44. See George E. Gardner, Charities and Trusts for Charitable Uses, in THE AMERI-
CAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW 893, 901 (David S. Garland et al. eds., 2d ed. 
1897). 
45. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMIENTARIES *47. 
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tury treatise was quoted in one of the earliest U.S. Supreme Court cases 
analyzing the power, 46 and it has been repeated ever since. 
Faith in the historical power of the English king being the foundation 
for American parens patriae power persisted throughout the twentieth 
century. For example, in 1972, in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Company of 
California, the U.S. Supreme Court echoed Blackstone and declared the 
doctrine had its roots in "the 'royal prerogative,"' which included the re-
sponsibility to care for "all infants, idiots and lunatics."'47 With little ex-
planation, the Court concluded that the old English "royal prerogative" 
and its attendant parens patriae power, belonging to the king, "passed to 48 
the States" at the time of the American Revolution. 
The Standard Oil opinion makes this sweeping historical conclusion 
without citing any sources or even offering arguments in support of the 
claim. The Court treats the conclusion as self-evident. American parens 
patriae power is depicted as simply emerging wholly formed from the 
transference of the Crown's power to the several states. 
The Court's conclusion regarding the transfer of the king's prerogatives 
to the states has not been interrogated by the scholarly literature-or 
even the Court's own subsequent opinions. 49 In the leading historical 
treatment of the doctrine published in 1976, George Curtis offered a de-
tailed account of the doctrine's use in England and concluded that "[t]he 
state has assumed [the king's] mantle."'50 He offered no analysis to sup-
port this conclusion about transference-pointing instead to a handful of 
Supreme Court decisions relying on the purported royal prerogative, 
without any independent historical support. 
This Article calls this mainstream historical explanation the Sover-
eignty Transference theory of parens patriae because its logic depends on 
some vestige of the English Crown's prerogatives transferring to the 
states at some specific historical moment during the American Revolu-
tion. It thus requires two premises to be true: first, that such a royal pre-
rogative existed in England at the time of the American Revolution, and 
second, that this power flowed through some mechanism to the newly 
independent states. 
Part II.A.2 examines both of these premises and concludes both are 
dubious at best, and probably outright false. 
2. The Mythology of Sovereignty Transference: Misunderstood 
Prerogatives & the Forgotten English Statutory Scheme 
Although modern American parens patriae cases assert that some gen-
eralized guardianship role of the English king transferring to the Ameri-
46. Trs. of Phila. Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S. 1, 47 (1819). 
47. 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47). 
48. Id. 
49. Scholars have generally taken the Court's historical assertions at face value. See, 
e.g., Lemos, supra note 9, at 493 n.22; Malina & Blechman, supra note 14, at 197-202. 
50. Curtis, supra note 41, at 914. 
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can states at Independence, early American cases discussing parens 
patriae power reflected a more complex narrative. In fact, early cases uni-
formly rejected the notion of any "prerogative power" vested in the 
courts of equity in the United States.5 1 In fact, the American Revolution 
was arguably aimed at dispensing with the power of the king and, by im-
plication, the royal prerogatives of the English Crown.5 2 
The early American court cases involving parens patriae presented 
only a single form of the alleged royal guardianship prerogative: supervi-
sion of charities. Indeed, in the first half of the nineteenth century, this 
was the sole context in which the Supreme Court discussed transference 
of any royal prerogatives and parens patriae power. As will be explained 
below, the states' power over charities was the foundational parens pa-
triae power in the Framing Era. 
Blackstone and other English sources described the king's supervision 
of charitable trusts as one of the core royal prerogatives, exercised 
through the lord chancellor. 53 This particular royal prerogative came up 
over and over again in early parens patriae cases in the first few decades 
of the American Republic: the first parens patriae cases after the Framing 
involved the need for states to use that discretionary sovereign power to 
reform charitable bequests. The king's power over charities is the neces-
sary starting point to test the transference theory because it was the royal 
prerogative courts focused upon in the Framing Era. 
As a matter of first principles, A.V. Dicey observed that the entire 
"power of the English state is concentrated in the Imperial Parliament. '54 
Parliament is the ultimate sovereign in England, 5 5 but it is not a singular 
entity: it consists of the Crown, the House of Lords, and the House of 
Commons. 56 It acts through all three constituent parts together, in order 
to enact legislation.57 The result is that when Parliament acts, the Crown 
alone lacks discretionary authority over the matter.58 Executive powers 
must nearly always be exercised under Acts of Parliament.59 This funda-
mental English constitutional feature is a significant (and intentional) 
constraint on the monarchy. 60 It is thus axiomatic that Parliament can 
51. See Garland, supra note 44, at 901 (cataloging early state and federal cases). 
52. See, e.g., In re Mun. Suffrage to Women, 36 N.E. 488,492 (Mass. 1894) (J. Holmes) 
("Hobbes urged his motion in the interest of the absolute power of King Charles I., and 
one of the objects of the constitution of Massachusetts was to deny it."). 
53. BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *427; Curtis, supra note 41, at 896 & n.5. 
54. A.V. DicEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF TH, LAW OF THE CONsTrITU-
TION 86 (8th ed., 1982); see also id. at 4 ("The power and jurisdiction of Parliament... is so 
transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within 
any bounds.") (quoting 4 Siim EDWARD COKE, INs'rIrUTES 0 Til LAWFS OF ENGLAND 36 
(London, 1644)); id. at 25 ("This doctrine of the legislative supremacy of Parliament is the 
very keystone of the law of the constitution."). 
55. Id. at 271. 
56. Id. at 268. 
57. Id. at 2. 
58. Id. at 271. 
59. Id. at 268. 
60. DicLY, supra note 54, at 268 (explaining that it "prevents those inroads upon the 
law of the land which a despotic monarch ... might effect by ordinances or decrees"). 
SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
constrain royal prerogatives. 
The parliamentary sovereignty described by Dicey in 1895 was already 
firmly entrenched in England by the end of the eighteenth century, at the 
time of the American Revolution.61 Thus, the Framing generation in the 
United States would have understood the concept of the King-in-Parlia-
ment, where the Crown functioned as merely one of Parliament's three 
constituent parts. The notion of benevolent, absolutist monarchs serving 
as guardians of the realm would have likely seemed at best fanciful and at 
worst downright dangerous to the Framers. 62 Indeed, the idea of it con-
tradicted the core premise of the American Republic, where sovereignty 
in the constitutional compact flows from the people through the Constitu-
tion to the states and federal government, 63 and not from the king (or 
of 64 even Parliament) down through the rest the government. 
The concept of parliamentary sovereignty in England necessarily im-
plies that Parliament, acting collectively, has power over the Crown, act-
ing alone. 65 Indeed, Dicey observed that even the King's own "claim to 
reign depends upon and is the result of a statute. '66 Dicey showed this 
principle was settled in England by the seventeenth century. 67 By 1610, it 
was judicially settled that the Crown had no power to make law, and the 
Crown's power had been checked by Parliament. 68 This had implications 
for the royal prerogatives. 
Continental notions of powerful royal prerogatives, popularized in 
France, had a short run in England during the Stuart line into the seven-
teenth century. 69 In a time of religious and political turmoil, the Crown 
had unprecedented power, ultimately leading to increased power of the 
dreaded Star Chamber as an expression of the royal prerogative. 70 This 
61. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 
HARV. L. REv. 1613, 1644 & n.171 (2011). 
62. See Daniel D. Birk, Marbury, Hayburn's Case, and the Separation of the Judicial 
and Executive Powers (July 20, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 
2811668 [https://perma.cc/U7D8-M6NW]. 
63. See U.S. CONSI. pmbl. 
64. An astute observer of the American Republic, Dicey noted that the English parlia-
mentary sovereignty distinguished it from our federal constitutional system, where residual 
power that is not vested in Congress belongs to the states. See Dici y, supra note 54, at 
73-74. By contrast England has no such structure. Id. Acts of Parliament can be repealed 
by Parliament (but not by the king alone). Id. at xlii. 
65. Id. at 5 ("True it is, that what the Parliament doth, no authority upon earth can 
undo.") (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *160-61). 
66. Id. at 6. 
67. Id. The reign of Henry VIII and an Act of Parliament granting the Crown power 
to legislate in parallel in 1529 was the high-water mark of the Crown's power in England, 
and it was relatively short-lived and soon repealed, according to Dicey, because "of its 
inconsistency with the whole tenor of English law." Id. at 11. 
68. Id. at 13 (explaining that such proclamations "serve to call the attention of the 
public to the law, but they cannot of themselves impose upon any man any legal obligation 
or duty not imposed by common law or by Act of Parliament."). 
69. Id. at 242. 
70. See id. at 242-43 (describing Bacon's archaic view that the royal "prerogative was 
something beyond and above the ordinary law" being akin to French monarchic institu-
tions); see also Pfander & Birk, supra note 61, at 1644 n.171 (discussing the end of the 
"absolutist ambitions of the Stuart kings" being replaced by "parliamentary supremacy"). 
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augmentation of the Crown's authority ultimately failed in the seven-
teenth century when parliamentary sovereignty emerged as the prevailing 
ideal and political reality. 7 ' 
Thus, the robust English royal prerogatives that were a feature of the 
Stuart Kings' absolutist designs were already waning in England more 
than a century before the Framing. Indeed, there are reasons to doubt the 
political reality of the version of the prerogatives popularized by Black-
stone, who described them as "positive substantial parts of the royal char-
acter and authority. '72 Indeed, English legal scholars have long observed 
the wide gulf between Blackstone's idealized theory of the monarchy and 
the real King's powers. 73 This disconnect has been described as flowing 
from "two different senses in which the word King is employed. ' 74 One 
refers to a theory of the ideal of the King, and the other is a real King 
of shared governance. 75 operating in a political reality 
Blackstone referred to the King in the idealized sense, when he theo-
rized that the guardianship prerogative reflected the King as "the foun-
his the 6 tain of justice, always present in all courts, fountain of honor. '7
Indeed, John Allen, writing in the early nineteenth century, recognized 
this was a fictionalized King for the theory of monarchy, not the "real 
King of the constitution. 7' 7 
For purposes of the Sovereignty Transference theory of parens patriae 
power in America, the King's real power at the time of independence is 
key, as the theory relies on a premise of actual transference of power. 
However, by 1601, Parliament had already taken control of supervision of 
charities through legislation. 
The next Part will show that the lack of a robust royal prerogative to 
supervise charities at the time of the Framing undermines a core premise 
of the Sovereignty Transference theory of parens patriae power. 
3. The Statute of Elizabeth of 1601 & Parliament's Supervisory Powers 
Given that Parliamentary sovereignty is the first principle of the En-
glish constitutional system, it necessarily follows that Parliament has the 
power to take control of matters that once were royal prerogatives. Sir 
Edward Coke famously held in the seventeenth century that "the King 
71. DICEY, supra note 54, at 245. 
72. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *239-40. 
73. See, e.g., JOHN ALLEN, INQUIRY INTO THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE ROYAL 
PREROGATIVE IN ENGLAND 34-35 (1849 ed.) ("Blackstone either contradicts himself... 
or, when he ascribes sovereignty without qualification to the King, he speaks of the ideal 
King, who is supposed by a legal fiction to represent and possess the whole power and 
authority of the state, and not the real King, who cannot pass a turnpike act without the 
advice and consent of his Lords and Commons. The ideal King of the lawyers is a King 
above law; the real King of the constitution is a King subject to law."). 
74. Id. at 35. 
75. Id. 
76. Curtis, supra note 41, at 896; see ALLEN, supra note 73, at 35 ("Perfection is an-
other attribute of royalty, which the lawyers have found a difficulty in transferring from 
their own fictitious creation to the real King of the constitution."). 
77. ALLEN, supra note 73, at 35. 
SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him." 78 
Indeed, Sir William Holdsworth asserted that the idea of the primacy of 
law over the King's prerogative was a dominant political idea stretching 7
all the way back to the Middle Ages. 9 
Though the royal prerogatives may have been historically "the residue 
of discretionary or arbitrary authority,"80 the nature of the prerogative 
changed in the seventeenth century. Parliament cut away the royal pre-
rogatives in many areas. 81 Indeed, in 1689, the Bill of Rights brought the 
idea of royal prerogatives expressly under Parliament's control by clarify-
or revoke any prerogative power."'82 ing that "Parliament could amend 
The King also lacked the power to create new prerogatives after this.8 3 In 
other words, the entire universe of potential prerogatives was limited to 
those existing before 1689, and tolerated by Parliament. 84 Parliament's 
control over the prerogative powers in that era also resulted in the reloca-
tion of those powers from "the Monarch in person to the Monarch's ad-
visers or ministers"-in the sense that they simply became powers of the 
government, not of the King.85 central 
By the time of the American Revolution, royal prerogatives were thus 
already limited. The question thus becomes what royal guardianship pow-
ers existed in 1689 and persisted into the eighteenth century. Long before 
1689, the royal prerogative related to charitable trusts had already been 
taken over by Parliament. In 1601, Parliament passed an act that went to 
the very heart of the King's duty to care for those who could not care for 
themselves. The Statute of Elizabeth of 1601, "An Acte to redresse the 
Misemployment of Landes Goodes and Stockes of Money heretofore 
given to Charitable Uses."' 86 Though this statute has long been the subject 
of intensive study by scholars of the law of charities, 87 it has been largely 
overlooked by modern proponents of Sovereignty Transference and 
78. Brigid Hadfield, Judicial Review and the Prerogative Powers of the Crown, in THE 
NATrUre OF THE CROWN: A LEGAL AND PoiIrICAi ANALYSIS 197, 198 (Maurice Sunkin et 
al. eds., 1999) (quoting Case of Proclamations (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 1352; 12 Co. Rep. 74, 
76). 
79. 10 SIll WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 358 (Methuen & Co. 
Ltd. 1975) (1903). 
80. Dici Y, supra note 54, at 282; see also Hadfield, supra note 78, at 200. 
81. Hadfield, supra note 78 at 198-99; see also HOLDSWORTH, supra note 79, at 340 
("[T]hough the King was personally above the law, his prerogative was subject to it."). 
82. Hadfield, supra note 78, at 199; HoLDswORTH, supra note 79, at 361 ("After 1688 
it was clear that the prerogative in all its parts was subject to law."). 
83. Hadfield, supra note 78, at 199. 
84. See id. 
85. Id. 
86. Statute of Charitable Uses 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c 4 (Eng.) 
87. See, e.g., JAMES J. FISHMAN, THE FAIrIIIESs FIDUCIARY AND THE QUE7ST FOR 
CHARITABLFE ACCOUNTAIII TY 1200-2005 85-87 (2007); James J. Fishman, Charitable Ac-
countability and Reform in Nineteenth-Century England: The Case of the Charity Commis-
sion, 80 CHI.-KENT L. Riv. 723, 729 & n.31 (2005); Rupert Sargent Holland, The Modern 
Law of Charities as Derived from the Statute of Charitable Uses, 52 AM. L. REG. 201, 203 
(1904); Jill R. Horwitz, Nonprofits and Narrative: Piers Plowman, Anthony Trollope, and 
Charities Law, 4 MICH. ST. L. REv. 989, 996 (2009). 
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scholars of parens patriae, despite the emergence of parens patriae in the 
Founding Era in America in charity cases. 
The Statute of Elizabeth had enormous significance in the history of 
charities in England and America in that it defined the range of accept-
able charitable purposes. 88 Colonial law followed these same charitable 
purposes.89 It thus had clear substantive dimension. Professor Jill Hor-
witz observed that this statute was in part inspired by Henry VIII's con-
flict with the church over property rights, worth one-third to one-half of 
all the wealth in England.90 Professor James Fishman also documented 
the responsiveness of the statute to the economic problems of the 1590s 
in which forty percent of the English population could not maintain basic 
subsistence, malnutrition was rampant, and property crimes were escalat-
ing.91 Meanwhile, efforts to provide relief for the poor were unpopular 
resistance. 92 and met stiff 
The Statute of Elizabeth was part of a package of "poor law legisla-
tion" from 1597 to 1601 that sought to respond to the economic and social 
crisis.93 The statutory scheme was designed to encourage and facilitate 
private philanthropy to benefit the poor.94 These "poor laws" persisted in 
England without meaningful change until 1834.95 
A core feature of the Statute of Elizabeth was the creation of a system 
of legal accountability for charitable gifts. 9 6 This was responsive to a pop-
ular perception that trustees of charitable organizations often swindled 
donors.97 This perception probably had its roots in Henry VIII's dissolu-
tion of church monasteries in the 1530s, based on alleged ecclesiastical 
misuse of charitable assets, 98 and the subsequent attempts by patrons to 
reclaim their past donations to the church. 99 In this environment, even 
after the Reformation, complaints to the chancellor (who acted on the 
King's behalf) often went unremedied, as the Chancery typically failed to 
offer any relief to claimants, responding instead with jurisdictional objec-
tions.10 0 Indeed, Professor Fishman contends that before 1597, there was 
no adequate procedure in the Chancery for the Crown to protect charita-
ble assets, and endless judicial delays were common.10 1 Worse, under the 
English system, a charity beneficiary petitioning for relief could have 
88. Horwitz, supra note 87, at 996. 
89. Id. at 1001. 
90. Id. at 995. 
91. FSIHMAN, supra note 87, at 86. 
92. Id. at 86, 97. 
93. Id. at 87, 94, 96. 
94. Id. at 88-89. 
95. Id. at 87. 
96. Id. at 99-100. 
97. Id. at 100-01. 
98. Fishman, supra note 87, at 29-30. 
99. Id. at 30. Fishman describes accounts of "forcible seizure" of such donations, rang-
ing from a widow retrieving a cow, to cities making large expropriations. Id. 
100. FISHMAN, supra note 87, at 99-100 (describing hyper-technical procedural objec-
tions that doomed such claims and prevented relief). 
101. Id. at 100. 
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been forced to pay legal costs if the claim was unsuccessful, resulting in 
financial ruin.10 2 
Prior to the Statute of Elizabeth, the King's agents thus effected little 
actual guardianship with regard to charity supervision, despite whatever 
residual, historical royal prerogatives may have theoretically existed. The 
royal prerogative and beneficence that existed in Blackstone's ideal the-
ory of the monarchy probably rarely protected real victims of misman-
aged or plundered charities. This was the social context for Parliament's 
creation of a new oversight scheme to ensure effective charitable supervi-
sion so that the public would have confidence that donations would be 
used for their intended purpose. 10 3 
The statute created new procedures to investigate theft or misuse of 
assets and clarified the chancellor's role.10 4 These new procedures in-
cluded the appointment of commissioners to investigate improper use of 
assets) 0 5 The preamble also enumerated the permissible charitable uses 
particularly on relief of poverty.10 6 under the statute's ambit, focusing Im-
portantly, the statute also gave direction to the chancellor about enforc-
ing and reforming bequests.10 7 
Parliament's exercise of power over the supervision of charities makes 
it impossible to treat such supervision as a pure royal prerogative by the 
time of the Revolution. Indeed, even Blackstone is understood to have 
defined prerogatives as exclusive and unique to the Crown, not shared 
with Parliament.1 08 Once a power became authorized by, defined by, and 
controlled by Parliament, it ceased to be a true "prerogative."10 9 
By 1601, any historical royal prerogative regarding charities had be-
come constrained by a statutory scheme. In other words, charitable su-
pervision became a creature of parliamentary control, no longer 
possessed by the Crown alone. By the time of the American Revolution, 
any sovereign "guardianship power" over charities thus had statutory 
constraints. Charitable supervision thus cannot properly be considered a 
true prerogative after this period. 11 0 There was therefore no true royal 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 101. 
105. Holland, supra note 87, at 203. 
106. FiSHMAN, supra note 87, at 102; Horwitz, supra note 86, at 999. 
107. Trs. of Phila. Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1819). 
108. Sir William Wade, The Crown, Ministers and Officials: Legal Status and Liability, 
in Tim. NATURE OF THE CROWN, A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 23, 30 (Maurice 
Sunkin et al. eds., 1999) ("Blackstone pointed out that 'prerogative' power should, prop-
erly speaking, mean power which is unique to the Crown-for example, the power of par-
don, the power to create a peer and the power to summon and dissolve Parliament-as 
distinct from powers which the Crown shares with its subjects .... But the courts lost sight 
of this distinction and took to using 'prerogative' indiscriminately for any act of the Crown 
that was not authorised by statute."). 
109. See id. 
110. Id. (discussing Blackstone's definition of a royal prerogative as meaning "power 
which is unique to the Crown" and not shared). 
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prerogative to transfer in this area at the time of American 
Independence. 
This history makes the Sovereignty Transference theory untenable be-
cause charitable supervision was the core area of parens patriae litigation 
in early eighteenth century America. The next Part will show that the 
Framing generation understood the relationship between Parliament and 
the Crown and the importance of Acts of Parliament being received (or 
rejected) by the new states. Indeed, there was considerable disagreement 
about the effect of English legislation about charities in the new states in 
the early years of the Republic-and that disagreement meaningfully im-
pacted the American understanding of the states' parens patriae power in 
the decades that followed. This disagreement manifested in a stunning 
reversal by the Supreme Court on the effect of one of those "received" 
Acts of Parliament with regard to the parens patriae power.1 1' 
4. The American States' Reception of the English Statute of Elizabeth 
Prior to the American Revolution, colonial law already recognized 
many of the charitable uses defined by the Statute of Elizabeth.)' 2 After 
Independence, the statute was recognized by six states, and was re-en-
acted by two more.11 3 Pennsylvania additionally recognized "principles 
that properly emanate from it," without actually adopting it.114 Neverthe-
less, it was eventually repealed or rejected by twelve states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. 115 Reception of any uniform American parens patriae 
power through the statute would thus be impossible to establish, given 
the statute's widespread rejection by various states. 
In 1819, this problem of inconsistent reception reached the U.S. Su-
preme Court when a case came out of Virginia, a state that expressly 
repealed the Statute of Elizabeth. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion con-
sidered the exercise of parens patriae power of the new American states 
in the context of the enforcement of charitable bequests . 1 6 The case con-
cerned a will made in Virginia in 1790, bequeathing property to perpetu-
ally fund the education of Baptist youths in Philadelphia interested in 
becoming ministers.11 7 Two years after the will was created, the Virginia 
Legislature repealed all English statutes, including the Statute of Eliza-
111. Trs. of Phila. Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S. 1, 47-50 (1819), overruled by 
Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U.S. 127, 192-96 (1844). 
112. Horwitz, supra note 86, at 1001. 
113. Holland, supra note 87, at 207 (listing Maine, Massachusetts, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Missouri, and North Carolina as recognizing the Statute of Elizabeth, while Connecticut 
and Rhode Island re-enacted it). 
114. Id. (quoting Wright v. Linn, 9 Pa. 433, 435 (1848)); see also Miller v. Porter, 53 Pa. 
292, 299 (1866); Gardner, supra note 44, at 899-900. 
115. Holland, supra note 87, at 207 (listing California, Delaware, the District of Colum-
bia, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia, as rejecting the Statute of Elizabeth); Gardner, 
supra note 44, at 900 (listing the same states). 
116. Phila. Baptist Ass'n, 17 U.S. at 2. 
117. Id. at 2-3. 
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beth.11 8 Shortly thereafter, the testator died. 119 The informal Baptist As-
sociation in Philadelphia had not yet incorporated, so the estate's 
executor refused to convey the property because, at the time of the testa-
tor's death, the individuals who composed the association were not le-
gally authorized to collect and the association itself had no legal 
existence. 120 Without a lawful beneficiary, the bequest technically failed, 
and the question was whether the bequest could be reformed by the state 
patriae power. 121 using the state's parens 
As an initial matter, the opinion identified the state attorney general as 
the proper party to take up any residual parens patriae power.1 2 2 It ob-
served that the practice of the attorney general filing an information 
"might very well grow out of [the royal] prerogative" to supervise charita-
ble uses.1 23 For this reason, the opinion required the attorney general to 
be made a party.124 This mechanical observation had monumental impor-
tance for the development of an American form of parens patriae doc-
trine-it designated state attorneys general as the proper parties to assert 
parens patriae power. 
Chief Justice Marshall approached the problem regarding the Statute 
of Elizabeth in Virginia by looking at the Chancery's power in England 
over charitable devises.1 25 He concluded that the English case law estab-
lished that "bequests are void, independent of the [Statute of Elizabeth], 
and good under it."126 In other words, the power of the Chancery to en-
force vague or indefinite bequests depended on the statutory power.' 
27 
Since Virginia had repealed the Statute of Elizabeth, the petitioner ar-
gued that the Court could reform the will by exercising the prerogative of 
the King as parens patriae that had existed before the Statute of Eliza-
beth. 128 Such an approach would have simply pretended Parliament had 
never passed the statute, by looking at the Crown's power before the stat-
ute's enactment. In other words, it would have arrogated to Virginia 
power that had not actually existed in England since 1601. Without re-
marking on the contra-factual nature of the request, the Court found no 
cases supporting that power, and indeed, observed that while such power 
existed under the Civil Law in European nations, England had not 
adopted any civil code on charitable devises and had many rules at odds 
with civilian principles.1 2 9 Indeed, Justice Marshall found ample support 
118. Id. at 2. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 2-3, 28. 
121. Id. at 2. 
122. Phila. Baptist Ass'n, 17 U.S. at 39. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 50. 
125. Id. at 32-33. 
126. Id. at 33. 
127. Id. at 43. 
128. Phila. Baptist Ass'n, 17 U.S. at 3-4, 43. 
129. Id. at 43-44; see also id. at 46 ("[T]he doctrines of the court of chancery, peculiar 
to charities, originated not in the civil law, but in the statute of Elizabeth."). 
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in English cases for a conclusion that the Chancery understood its power 
to supervise charitable bequests as defined and limited by the statute.130 
While acknowledging that some form of royal prerogative had existed 
to enforce charities "in very early times," the boundaries of that preroga-
131 tive were lost in the mist of time prior to the Statute of Elizabeth.
Justice Marshall thus read Blackstone's description of the King's broad 
power over charities as being historical and theoretical. 132 
Justice Marshall appears to have understood that whatever power the 
King may have had in ancient times became bounded by statute once 
Parliament acted. 133 The prerogative power had already become statu-
tory through Parliament's enactment of the Statute of Elizabeth. This 
Framing Era understanding undermines a key premise of the Sovereignty 
Transference theory.134 At least from an Originalist perspective, Sover-
eignty Transference fails. 
This conclusion is strengthened by another case, decided a few years 
later in 1830, in which a concurrence observed the correctness of Baptist 
Association's understanding of the statute. 135 Justice Johnson went even 
further, observing that "[t]he plain object of the act of 43 Eliz. is to place 
in commission a troublesome branch of the royal prerogative .... ",136 The 
Statute of Elizabeth had "swallowed up" the royal prerogative. 137 Thus, 
the chancellor's own authority thereafter flowed from the statute, not 
royal prerogative.. 38 from the 
Johnson was not alone in agreeing with Marshall. Justice Story revealed 
in 1830 that he too had been satisfied with Marshall's opinion in the Bap-
tist Association case.1.39 As Part II.B explains, Justice Story later changed 
his mind and eventually wrote an opinion overruling Baptist Association. 
His opinion inaugurated a new era of parens patriae power based on 
130. Id. at 45 (discussing Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399, affd 10 Ves. 
540); id. at 46 ("[Tjhe chancellor says, 'it is the duty of the trustees, or of the crown, to 
apply the money to charity, in the sense which the determinations have affixed to the word 
in this court: viz., either such charitable purposes as are expressed in the statute, or to 
purposes analogous to those.'"). 
131. Id. at 47. 
132. Phila. Baptist Ass'n, 17 U.S. at 48-50. 
133. Id. at 48-49 ("This superintending power of the Crown, therefore, over charities, 
must be confined to those which are valid in law."). 
134. The opinion also made an important point by observing that even if some hypo-
thetical powers of the king might have transferred independent of the statute, exercising 
them would requires the state's attorney general to be a party. Id. at 50. As Virginia's 
attorney general was not joined, there was no possibility of even considering the matter. Id. 
at 50. 
135. Inglis v. Trs. of Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. 99, 139 (1830) (Johnson, J., concur-
ring) ("The correctness of the decision of this court therefore in the Baptist Association 
case cannot, I think, be disputed."). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. ("This controlling power being absolute and final, soon swallowed up its par-
ent, and became original and absolute."). 
138. Id. ("[N]o other authority for its exercise has ever been claimed by the chancellor 
but the 43d Elizabeth."). 
139. Id. at 149-50 (Story, J., concurring). 
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common law alone, 140 which eventually led to a "general law of chari-
ties." The Supreme Court's reversal planted the seed for current confu-
sion over the source of the parens patriae power. 
B. THE UNIVERSAL SOVEREIGNTY THEORY OF AMERICAN 
PARENS PATRIAE POWER 
In the mid-nineteenth century, a different historical narrative emerged 
from the Supreme Court to justify parens patriae power in the American 
states. It appeared just as the federal general law was expanding in the 
Swift v. Tyson era,1 4 1 and it was in fact closely related to the general law. 
This alternative theory eventually derived parens patriae power from uni-
versal principles of sovereignty. Under the new theory, the power flowed 
not from prerogatives of the English Crown, but rather from universal 
principles about what it means to be a functioning government. 
Following a mode of reasoning remarkably similar to the derivation of 
the federal general law of negotiable instruments deduced in Swift, the 
Court in this era eventually looked to Roman law and history to derive 
"general principles" of state power to explain parens patriae powers of 
42 
American states.1
1. Rejecting the Statute of Elizabeth in Favor of Common Law to 
Justify American State Power over Charities 
The American states' supervisory powers over charities reached the Su-
preme Court again in 1844.143 This is precisely the same subject in which 
Blackstone had posited that a theoretical royal prerogative existed, but 
Justice Marshall had found depended on an act of Parliament in Baptist 
Association; however, Justice Story chose to approach the matter 
144 differently.
Vidal v. Girard's Executor involved a massive fortune devised to the 
city of Philadelphia. 145 A very wealthy citizen of Philadelphia bequeathed 
a fortune to the city to (among other things) improve a neighborhood in 
140. Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, et al., 43 U.S. 127, 192-95 (1853). 
141. 41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842) (developing a federal common law of contracts and commer-
cial transactions based on "general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence"). 
142. See id. ("The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the 
languages of Cicero, adopted by Lord MANSFIELD in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 883, 887, to be 
in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world. Non 
erit alia lex Rornae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni 
tempore una eademque lex obtinebit."). 
143. See Vidal, 43 U.S. at 127-128. 
144. Id. at 192-93. 
145. Id. at 128-29. The case loosely implicated the English Statutes of Mortmain, elev-
enth-century statutes that once prevented land from passing into the possession of the 
Church or religious corporations. See id. at 144-45. They came to be understood as pre-
cluding estates from passing to corporations without royal assent. See id. Nevertheless, 
Philadelphia's charter allowed it to take ownership of real and personal property by devise, 
as the relevant English statute was not in effect. Id. at 185-87. 
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order to promote the health of its citizens, 46 found a college,1 47 and edu-
cate orphans. 148 The testator identified the mayor, aldermen, and citizens 
of Philadelphia as beneficiaries. 49 The fortune was so enormous that the 
Pennsylvania Legislature passed an act in 1832 specifically to enable the 
city to accept the bequest.15 0 The testator's heirs then sued to invalidate 
15 1 the bequest was void. 152 the bequest. They argued 
The heirs made two important arguments for the failure of the bequest: 
(1) the city's representatives were incapable of legally executing the pur-
ported trust or holding the property for the benefit of others, and (2) the 
trust's charitable purposes and beneficiaries were too indefinite under the 
common law of Pennsylvania.1 53 The Statute of Elizabeth was not in ef-
fect in Pennsylvania, as had been true of Virginia in Baptist Associa-
tion.154 Story acknowledged that, in Baptist Association, Justice Marshall 
had found no English common law authority to establish the legal entity 
necessary to further the testator's intentions, where the case involved a 
donation to a trustee who lacked legal capacity to take the property and 
indefinite beneficiaries.' 55 Nevertheless, the Court in Vidal reached the 
opposite result and upheld the lower court's decision to allow the state to 
establish the charitable trusts in Pennsylvania.1 56 In other words, Penn-
sylvania had the power that Virginia lacked, though it too had not re-
ceived the Statute of Elizabeth. The difference for the Court was not state 
law, but rather a reinterpretation of English legal history. 
Relying on an English case in which the Court of Chancery had re-
viewed a charitable bequest for a school and upheld the charitable use, 
Justice Story's opinion declared that it was clear that the Chancery had 
the power to create and enforce charities (and charitable trusts) even 
where the Statute of Elizabeth did not extend to the use. 157 From this, he 
concluded that there was a common law power in the Chancery that was 
independent of the statute.'5 8 He relied on the "dicta of eminent [Chan-
cery] judges" to conclude that "charitable uses might be enforced in chan-
cery upon the general jurisdiction of the court, independently of the 
statute of 43 of Elizabeth.' 5 9 Justice Story then concluded that the stat-
ute was purely jurisdictional, creating commissions to oversee charities, 
146. Id. at 129. 
147. Id. at 130. 
148. Vidal, 43 U.S. at 129, 132. 
149. Id. at 129. 
150. Id. at 138, 190-91. 
151. Id. at 139-43. 
152. Id. at 143, 186. 
153. Id. at 192-93. 
154. Vidal, 43 U.S. at 192. The Court concluded that the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania had rejected the statute for procedural reason, but it acknowledged the statute's 
list of charitable uses, as well as others that had been supported in chancery before the 
statute, were recognized in Pennsylvania. Id. 
155. Id. at 192-93. 
156. Id. at 201-02. 
157. Id. at 193. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 194. 
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without creating "new law" or altering parens patriae power of the 
King.160 Thus, the state could use parens patriae powers to ensure the 
property went to the intended charitable use. 
In Justice Story's view, English common law parens patriae power ex-
isted separately from the Statute of Elizabeth, so it was as though the 
statute never existed. This view is antithetical to the English constitu-
tional value of parliamentary sovereignty and erroneously treats the com-
mon law as being on equal footing with parliamentary acts. It is also 
undercut by historical work by charities scholars regarding the abject fail-
ures of the Chancery in the area of charity supervision and the historical 
reasons why Parliament chose to constrain equitable discretion and cod-
ify the subject. Finally, the opinion perhaps accepted the Chancery's own 
self-serving pronouncements of its own power viz-a-viz Parliament, de-
spite historical allegations that English equity subverted the rule of law 
the length of the chancellor's foot.1 6 1 and caused cases to turn on 
Justice Story also overlooked the fact that the English common law on 
point was irrelevant. Pennsylvania's Supreme Court in 1827 had declared 
that, "by force of our own common law," relief of the sort requested here 
could be given because its common law adopted the "principles" of the 
statute, as applied by the Chancery.162 Pennsylvania's courts had them-
selves recognized that the Chancery "applied" the legislative principles 
from Parliament. Story's musing about English common law, that may or 
may not have existed before the statute's passage, was nothing more than 
irrelevant dicta, as far as the state's own courts were concerned, since 
Pennsylvania's own common law applied the principles of the Statute of 
Elizabeth. 
Given that Justice Story was also the author of Swift v. Tyson (another 
case disregarding state common law in favor of the Supreme Court's own 
derivation of law), 163 the disregard for a state supreme court's judicial 
pronouncements on the content of its own state common law in Vidal 
seems emblematic of Justice Story's broader legal philosophy (an archaic 
Supreme Court approach that met its end in Erie Railroad Company v. 
164 Tompkins).
Read from a modern perspective, the case should have turned on 
Pennsylvania's own common law as a foundation for the state's power to 
160. Vidal, 43 U.S. at 194-95. 
161. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, "Cardozo's Foot": The Chancellor's Conscience and 
Constructive Trusts, 56 LAw & CONriMP. PROBS. 7, 7 (1993) (quoting John Selden's articu-
lation of the "Chancellor's foot"). 
162. See Witman v. Lex, 17 Serg. & Rawle 88, 88 (Pa. 1827) (emphasis added) ("The 
statute 43 Eliz. ch. 4, of charitable uses, is not extended to Pennsylvania, but still the princi-
ples of it, as applied by chancery, in England, obtain here, by force of our own common 
law, and relief will be given so far as the power of the courts will enable them."); see also 
Miller v. Porter, 53 Pa. 292, 299 (1866) ("[T]his [S]tatute [of Elizabeth] was not extended to 
Pennsylvania, though its principles have been often recognised and declared to be part of 
our common law."). 
163. See generally 41 U.S. 1, 9 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64, 79-80 (1938). 
164. See 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938). 
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create charitable trusts. 165 This key legal difference distinguished Penn-
sylvania in Vidal from Virginia in Baptist Association. Pennsylvania's 
common law recognizing its own state power thus distinguished the case 
from Baptist Association, where Virginia had repealed the Statute of Eliz-
abeth but had not yet replaced it with common law of its own (or a legis-
lative enactment) that would have created an alternative source of 
positive power. 
The confusion Justice Story sowed with his frolic into old English 
Chancery cases that preceded the Statute of Elizabeth opened the door 
for a much bolder move on the part of the Supreme Court a few decades 
later. By claiming the Chancery had independent, inherent powers sepa-
rate from the statute, Justice Story had mistakenly hinted that this power 
might have an existence that Parliament could not affect. As explained in 
the next Part, this became the seed for the Universal Sovereignty theory 
of parens patriae. 
2. Inherent, Universal State Power as a Source Parens Patriae Doctrine 
In 1890, the Supreme Court applied the parens patriae doctrine to re-
solve a dispute over the ownership of land belonging to the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, seized by the United States in order to 
enforce a federal polygamy statute in the Utah territory. 66 As the prop-
erty had been held by the corporation for charitable uses, the Court in-
voked "those principles of reason and public policy which prevail in all 
civilized and enlightened communities" to justify the federal govern-
ment's oversight of those charitable purposes. 167 In so doing, it relied on 
the government's parens patriae power to oversee charities. The court 
made no distinction between the prior cases which had focused exclu-
sively on the parens patriae power of the states and this case involving the 
power of the federal government. 
The Court reasoned that this power to oversee charities "prevail[ed] in 
all civilized countries pervaded by the spirit of Christianity," and then 
traced these principles from Roman law through Continental Europe to 
England. 168 The Court's historical account began with the third century, 
in the Pandects of Justinian, referring to the government's power as 
parens patriae to oversee the disposition of charitable property for a par-
165. See Witman, 17 Serg. & Rawle at 88 ("The statute 43 Eliz. ch. 4, of charitable uses, 
is not extended to Pennsylvania, but still the principles of it, as applied by chancery, in 
England, obtain here, by force of our own common law, and relief will be given so far as 
the power of the courts will enable them."). 
166. Late Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1890). The U.S. Attorney General sought to seize a vast amount of real and 
personal property held by the church's corporate trustee (as the church had been incorpo-
rated under Utah law). Id. at 9. Upon the death of the church's trustee, the government 
asserted there was "no person lawfully authorized to take charge of, manage, preserve, or 
control said property," so it sought to appoint a receiver to hold the property of the corpo-
ration and wind up the corporation's affairs. Id. at 10. 
167. Id. at 50-51. 
168. Id. at 51-56. 
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ticular use as property given to the public. 169 Tracing instances of the doc-
trine through the French and Spanish Civil Codes, the Court found the 
same principles were widely used in England by the seventeenth cen-
tury.170 It concluded the power was nothing more than the "ordinary 
power of the court of chancery over trusts, and in part from the right of 
the government or sovereign, as parens patriae, to supervise the acts of 
public and charitable institutions in the interest of those to be benefited 
[sic] by their establishment .... 171 
The Latter-Day Saints opinion became foundational to modern Ameri-
can parens patriae doctrine, appearing at a critical moment when the doc-
trine was about to begin expanding. It departs from earlier attempts to 
connect the doctrine to English statutory or common law,172 claiming in-
stead a much more venerable-and universal-history. This purported 
universal history is critical, as the Court was engaging in a very specific 
kind of reasoning: it was deriving a general law of charities from the es-
sence of sovereignty (i.e., what it means to be a government). 
The opinion's broad language is emblematic of nineteenth century de-
claratory legal philosophy, invoking general, universal principles and cus-
toms to "find" common law. 173 The many historical instances the Court 
cited were described as mere "indicia of the general principle underlying 
them. 1 74 This statement reveals that the application of the parens patriae 
doctrine here was a reflection of general principles which the Court called 
"a general law of charities. 1 75 This "doctrine of charities" that it had 
derived from universal principles of sovereignty was then applied in the 
176 Utah territory.
The Court's language echoes similar language used in opinions describ-
ing the federal general law of Swift v. Tyson, though it had no specific 
connection to that body of mercantile common law. The federal general 
law was abolished in 1938 as a constitutional matter in Erie Railroad 
Company v. Tompkins.177 There is little left of the old federal general law 
(including any "general law of charities"). Erie returned that body of sub-
stantive law to the states, as a constitutional matter.178 Thus, a federal 
169. Id. at 52 (discussing instances of the doctrine under Roman law). 
170. Id. at 52-56. 
171. Id. at 56. 
172. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 41, at 895-96; Ratliff, supra note 13, at 1850. 
173. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, Tii TRANSFORMATION OF AMFIRICAN LAW 
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 121 (1992) (discussing late-nineteenth cen-
tury invocation of custom as a standard of justice); id. at 202-03 (discussing the "discovery" 
and "finding" metaphors of nineteenth century classical legal thinking). 
174. Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 51. 
175. Id. at 61-62 ("Coming to the case before us, we have no doubt that the general law 
of charities which we have described is applicable thereto.") (emphasis added); id. at 63 
("The foregoing considerations place it beyond doubt that the general law of charities, as 
understood and administered in our Anglo-American system of laws, was and is applicable 
to the case now under consideration.") (emphasis added). 
176. Id. at 6K-62. 
177. 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938). 
178. Id. 
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common law power to declare the parens patriae power of the state attor-
neys general cannot be grounded in pre-Erie notions rooted in the federal 
general law, or the values that spawned that body of law. 
The general law of charities invoked in Latter-Day Saints had another 
dimension apart from the federal common law it purported to create. It 
contained a powerful narrative about the fundamental power of states: 
the Court concluded that parens patriae power is intrinsic to the nature of 
government "whether that power is lodged in a royal person, or in the 
legislature. ' 179 It reasoned this power is essential to protect "the interests 
of humanity" and avoid "injury to those who cannot protect them-
selves."18 0 In other words, states (and the federal government) have the 
power by virtue of their mere existence-and federal courts had the right 
to declare that power. 81 
Three justices dissented from this view of inherent power, observing 
that Congress possesses only a limited, not inherent, power in our consti-
tutional system.182 Despite the obviousness of Article I's structural limita-
tions, their critique had little traction in the years that followed. Instead, 
the Universal Sovereignty narrative, rooted in Roman law and the prac-
tices of European monarchies, was deemed to have been transmitted to 
America through England. The Supreme Court had reified the monarchi-
cal royal prerogative into an inherent, extra-constitutional power of the 
federal government-without regard to the purpose of the American 
83 Revolution or the constitutional objectives of the Framing Era.' 
The nineteenth century principles embedded within Latter-Day Saints 
resurfaced in modern cases in other substantive areas, as recently as 1982. 
For example, Latter-Day Saints was cited with approval in Alfred A. 
Snapp & Sons v. Puerto Rico, a modern leading case on parens patriae 
power, in an employment discrimination case brought by Puerto Rico on 
179. Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 57. 
180. Id. 
181. The Court also invoked the Sovereignty Transference theory, reaching back to the 
power of the English king and reasoned that the "beneficent function" of the King as 
protector survived the American Revolution and became vested in the new nation's gov-
ernmental entities-particularly the legislature and its judiciary. Id. at 58-59 ("The state, 
by its legislature or its judiciary, interposes to preserve [charity funds] from dissipation and 
destruction, and to set them up on a new basis of usefulness, directed to lawful ends, coin-
cident, as far as may be, with the objects originally proposed."); id. at 60 ("By the Revolu-
tion, the state of Vermont succeeded to all the rights of the crown as to the unappropriated 
as well as appropriated glebes.") (quoting Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. 292, 334-35 
(1815)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court took it as self-evident that whatever 
intrinsic power the King had as guardian of the realm transferred to the states, and Con-
gress, in the new federal system. Id. at 56-57. It thus connected to the Sovereignty Trans-
ference theory of parens patriae power. Id. 
182. Id. at 67-68 (Fuller, J., dissenting). 
183. By contrast, in this same era, Justice Holmes, while on the bench of the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts, understood the irreconcilable contradiction between the power of 
the old monarchies and the American Revolution. See In re Mun. Suffrage to Women, 36 
N.E. 488, 492 (Mass. 1894) (J. Holmes) ("Hobbes urged his motion in the interest of the 
absolute power of King Charles I., and one of the objects of the constitution of Massachu-
setts was to deny it."). 
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behalf of its citizen workers.184 
The rationale of Latter-Day Saints remained influential well into the 
modern expansive era of the doctrine. It has cast a very large shadow 
over modern mass tort litigation, despite its roots in a form of federal 
common law that no longer exists. 
Universal Sovereignty deserves to be interred as a justification for 
parens patriae in the modern era, along with the rest of Swift's progeny, 
at least in so far as it reflects a federal common law doctrine purporting to 
define the state's own powers and duties over a substantive area constitu-
tionally assigned to the state (i.e., charitable bequests). Resting upon the 
rotten foundation of an imaginary federal general law of charities, such 
federal common law lacks any coherence in the post-Erie era. This is not 
to say, however, that a state's own common law is similarly constrained: 
state common law can evolve through any set of principles fitting to the 
state's own jurisprudence. Indeed, state common law was one of the earli-185 
est legal sources of parens patriae power in the Framing Era.
The universal principles of charity governance that gave rise to the fed-
eral common law doctrine of parens patriae vanished as a constitutional 
matter in 1938. Without those principles, the "inherent powers" that are 
derived from ancient experience vanish, and the federal common law 
they created crumbles. Instead, we are left with a constitutional system in 
which Congress has limited powers, states make the substantive laws of 
charities (by statute or by common law), and federal courts are out of the 
business of finding universal principles to declare state substantive com-
mon law. 
Moreover, the Universal Sovereignty theory's birth in a case about fed-
eral parens patriae power makes the theory dubious as an explanation for 
the development of that doctrine as it relates to state power. It obfuscates 
the difference between the limited constitutional power of the federal 
government and the residual power of the state governments. 
Unlike the Sovereignty Transference theory, the Universal Sovereignty 
theory was not widely replicated in subsequent cases, though Latter-Day 
Saints has been cited with approval in the modern era. Part III will ex-
plore the manner in which the shaky historical foundations of parens pa-
triae power morphed into the foundation for modern multi-billion mass 
tort litigation, repackaging the old Sovereignty Transference notion. 
1II. MASS TORTS & THE MODERN QUASI-SOVEREIGNTY 
THEORY OF AMERICAN PARENS PATRIAE POWER 
In the late-nineteenth century, the parens patriae doctrine began its 
evolution from power over charities toward all-purpose "guardianship 
power." A decade after Latter-Day Saints, in Louisiana v. Texas, a case 
invoking the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, parens patriae was in-
184. 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982). 
185. See discussion supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
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voked in a new context. 186 In 1899, Texas enacted quarantine regulations 
to prevent the spread of yellow fever and placed an embargo on all inter-
state commerce between the city of New Orleans and the state of Texas-
blocking the flow goods and people from the Port of New Orleans, which 
was then one of the nation's largest ports.' 8 7 Texas stationed armed 
guards to prevent goods produced in New Orleans from crossing the bor-
der.1 88 Apparently, only one isolated case of yellow fever had been re-
ported, and people in Louisiana suspected the Texans were using the 
quarantine as a ruse to steal shipping traffic from New Orleans for the 
benefit of the port of Galveston. 189 
Louisiana sued as parens patriae to enjoin the Texas embargo, asserting 
a role as "trustee, guardian, or representative of all her citizens."1 90 The 
Court interpreted the state's cause of action to be an assertion that the 
state was empowered to seek relief on behalf of its citizens, rather than a 
cause of action asserting a special injury to the state itself. 91 As such, it 
declined to extend the Court's original jurisdiction, as the case presented 
no controversy between the states themselves. 192 An injury to Louisiana's 
citizens alone was insufficient for purposes of the Court's original juris-
diction.' 93 However, the opinion broke new ground by implicitly recog-
nizing Louisiana's sovereign interest in the dispute affecting its citizens-
an interest later cases denominated a "quasi-sovereign" interest. 94 
Louisiana's sovereign interest here was not a version of the royal pre-
rogative (which focused on the king as guardian to a limited class of vul-
nerable subjects). It was something entirely new in the area of economic 
torts. This novel use of parens patriae expanded far beyond the guardian-
ship notions described in the early charity cases. It quickly replicated it-
self in other cases. 
A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE QUASI-SOVEREIGN THEORY IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL SUITS IN THE EARLY 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
The early 1900s were a time of enormous importance for the develop-
ment of modern parens patriae doctrine.19 5 Professors Ieyoub and Eisen-
berg opine that the development of the doctrine closely traced American 
186. See generally Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900) ("[T]he state of Louisiana 
presents herself in the attitude of parens patri[a]e, trustee, guardian, or representative of 
all her citizens."); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1(conferring jurisdiction over "Con-
troversies between two or more States . . 
187. Louisiana, 176 U.S. at 3-5. 
188. Malina & Blechman, supra note 14, at 204. 
189. Id. 
190. Louisiana, 176 U.S. at 19. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 22. 
194. Ratliff, supra note 8, at 1851. 
195. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1879 ("Most of the leading Supreme Court 
cases date from the early 1900s."). 
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industrialization-the state guardianship power reached air and water 
pollution just as those matters were issues of public importance in this era 96 
of rapid industrialization.' 
Professor Thomas Lee has persuasively argued that the emergence of 
state-as-plaintiff suits in the post-bellum period was closely connected to 
the influence of the doctrine of espousal in international law.197 Espousal 
in international law allowed an aggrieved foreigner's government to 
adopt the foreigner's private legal claim (such as a debt) and advance that 
claim in his stead, typically through diplomatic action or international ju-
dicial proceedings. 198 In other words, the foreign government would 
stand in as the plaintiff for its citizen, in a legal proceeding asserting 
rights belonging to that citizen. However, the foreign government had the 
power to use whatever means it chose to enforce this claim of its citizen, 
"including the waging of war, regardless of the provision of a private judi-
cial remedy in the American national courts." 199 This power was under-
stood to be a function of sovereignty.20 0 Professor Lee points out that the 
espousal doctrine has deep historical roots, going back to the Framing 
Era,20 1 and that it forcefully re-emerged at the end of the nineteenth and 
the beginning of the twentieth centuries. 20 2 However, the Supreme Court 
in that era rejected the doctrine of espousal between American states in 
New Hampshire v. Louisiana.20 3 The Court held that espousal rights be-
long only to nations and the American states surrendered them to the 
federal government. 20 4 Lee contends that the constitutional grant of orig-
inal jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in state vs. state controversies was 
2
a substitute for espousal rights. 0 5 
Professor Lee suggested that parens patriae power (in which a state 
sues to vindicate claims for a class of its citizens) is a "weaker, domestic 
cousin" of espousal rights under international law.20 6 Indeed, the demise 
of espousal power for the states in 1872 seems to have ushered in the rise 
of parens patriae as a separate, distinct doctrine in the decades that fol-
lowed. The temporal connection suggests that parens patriae became a 
substitute for espousal. 
196. Id. 
197. Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International 
Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court's Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based 
Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1765, 1862-66 (2004). 
198. Id. at 1855. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 1857. 
201. Id. at 1858 (discussing Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 429 (1793) (Iredell, J.)). 
202. Lee, supra note 197, at 1855-56. 
203. Id. at 1858 & n.403 (discussing New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 
(1883)); 1863 (observing that New Hampshire would have had a claim of espousal under 
international law against Louisiana in 1872 for the nonpayment of debts owed to New 
Hampshire citizens, but that the American states had no such espousal rights against one 
another). 
204. Id. at 1863. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 1855 n.393. 
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Consistent with this theory, there is a second, related potential causal 
trigger for the rise of the new breed of parens patriae in the late-nine-
teenth century: the expansion of state police powers.20 7 For example, just 
one year after recognizing Louisiana's interest in opposing a quarantine 
affecting its citizens, the Court expanded the concept of legitimate state 
interests in Missouri v. Illinois to include environmental torts.2 0 8 Missouri 
filed a bill of complaint asserting the Court's original jurisdiction in a 
dispute with Illinois over pollution of the Mississippi river.20 9 The suit's 
gravamen was public nuisance. 2 10 
Illinois had allowed Chicago to construct a canal to send virtually all its 
sewage to the Des Plaines River, which emptied into the Illinois River, 
and ultimately into the Mississippi River.211 Missouri complained that 
this new sewage plan would make it the recipient of 1,500 tons per day of 
Chicago's filth, including industrial waste from stock yards, distilleries, 
and manufacturing industries, all of which would otherwise have flowed 
into Lake Michigan.21 2 Illinois would thereby have allegedly poisoned the 
drinking water for Missouri's own communities.2 1 3 
The Court concluded that Missouri had the power to sue to protect the 
health and welfare of its citizens, and indeed an adequate remedy could 
only be found through such a parens patriae suit.214 It found the state to 
be the "proper party" to represent its inhabitants when those inhabitants' 
health and welfare was threatened. 21 5 It likened Missouri to a sovereign 
nation that would have the right to seek redress through negotiation or 
ultimately war to protect its citizens. As the several states have neither 
diplomatic nor war-making powers in our constitutional system, the 
Court reasoned that its own original jurisdiction must be the constitu-
tional solution.2 1 6 
The Court thus was not relying on any royal prerogative to sue.2 17 
Rather, the state's power to sue was instead treated as a substitute in our 
federal system for a different kind of sovereign right any nation-state 
would have had. This was thus a revision of the Universal Sovereignty 
theory: instead of inheriting specific prerogatives from England, the 
207. See HoRwrrz, supra note 173, at 27 ("By the 1870s, police power had become the 
standard legal category for talking about the state's regulatory power over health, safety, 
and morals of its citizens."). 
208. 180 U.S. 208, 248 (1901). 
209. Id. at 209. 
210. Id. at 214. 
211. Id. at 211. 
212. Id. at 212. 
213. 180 U.S. at 212-13. 
214. Id. at 241. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. The Court limited Louisiana v. Texas to its peculiar facts-causing Justice 
Fuller, who wrote that opinion, to dissent from the result in Missouri. See id. at 249 (Fuller, 
J., dissenting). 
217. See Malina & Blechman, supra note 14, at 202 ("The significant point is that, de-
spite the reliance of several States on the precedents we have discussed, the law governing 
the royal prerogative of the English King has no bearing on our problem."). 
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states impliedly had different, unique powers that were analogs to the 
powers of sovereign nations, transformed to comport with constitutional 
limits. 
This transition is crucial to understanding the failure of the Sovereignty 
Transference narrative as a foundation for American parens patriae 
power: according to Blackstone, public nuisance could be nothing more 
than a delegation of the individual's right to abate a nuisance.218 How-
ever, these nineteenth century American courts understood the exercise 
of state's own police power in these suits to grounded upon a common 
law of nuisance, and the nuisance was a public right.21,9 As historian Mor-
ton Horwitz explained, in police power cases in the 1870s, "the law of 
nuisance provided the categories for determining when it was legitimate 
for the state to regulate on behalf of the health, safety, and morals of its 
citizens. '2 20 These categories became the boundaries of parens patriae 
authority for the state to sue in that era. 
Over the next two decades, a state's "quasi-sovereign" power to sue to 
protect its environment on behalf of its citizens was upheld in other con-
texts, including diverting stream water,221 cross-border air pollution from 
an industrial plant,222 natural gas,22 3 and drainage of waterways. 224 Pro-
fessor Lee's research has shown a significant increase in such state-as-
plaintiff cases involving the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in this 
era between 1870-1919 (in which the Supreme Court issued forty-nine 
such dispositions), whereas there had only been six in the twenty-five-
year period preceding the Civil War.22 5 
The suits also soon escaped from the murky confines of original juris-
diction, with states beginning to sue private out-of-state tortfeasors. In 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company, Georgia sued a foreign corpora-
tion allegedly discharging noxious gases into Georgia from a plant in Ten-
nessee.226 Justice Holmes found that the discharge implicated Georgia's 
quasi-sovereign capacity because there was a state interest "independent 
of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its 
domain. '227 A distinction had thus fully emerged between the interests of 
citizens affected within a state and the state's own public interest in the 
welfare of its citizens collectively. 228 
The distinction between citizen interests and sovereign interests was 
important for the Court's original jurisdiction, though not necessarily for 
218. HORWIZ, supra note 173, at 27-28 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONF, COMMENTA-
RlIS *219). 
219. Id. at 27-28. 
220. Id. at 28. 
221. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 46 (1907). 
222. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907). 
223. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 581 (1923). 
224. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 371 (1923). 
225. Lee, supra note 197, at 1870. 
226. 206 U.S. at 236. 
227. Id. at 237. 
228. Malina & Blechman, supra note 14, at 206, 207. 
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other cases in the lower courts. Parens patriae became part of the Court's 
original jurisdiction out of necessity, in order to allow states to protect the 
general welfare-where they had no other constitutional means of doing 
so.229 Individual interests could be protected through individual suits so 
there is no argument of necessity supporting original jurisdiction in mass 
torts,2 30 but nor was there an argument forbidding it in lower courts. 
State suits on behalf of the interests of citizens instead were eventually 
justified through the expansive quasi-sovereignty theory of parens 
patriae. 
By this point in the doctrine's development, there could be no possible 
claim that this authority to sue to protect the environment derived from 
any English doctrine of royal prerogatives, or even universal, inherent 
powers generally found in ancient European history. The research of 
Professors Woolhandler and Collins has demonstrated that there was no 
state power at common law to bring federal public nuisance suits on be-
half of citizens as opposed to those suits brought on behalf of the state's 
own particular injury. 231 The evolution of the parens patriae power in 
public nuisance suits thus cannot be connected to any transferred power 
from England, or even universal sovereignty rights. It was a new feature 
of the American system. 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, parens patriae was no longer 
tethered to any historical antecedents in England, medieval Europe, or 
ancient Rome. It was sui generis in America, a quasi-sovereign right im-
plied by the constitutional structure. This branch of the doctrine appears 
to be properly understood as an offshoot of Universal Sovereignty 
through the right of espousal in international law (commencing from the 
premise that all sovereign nations have the power to go to war to protect 
their interests from incursions), translated through the lens of the emerg-
ing state police powers to morph it into a new, different kind of power in 
the American federalist structure. 
Nevertheless, as will be seen in the next Part, the modern doctrine con-
tinued to be mired in the false history of Sovereignty Transference. 
B. THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY EXPANSION OF THE 
QUASI-SOVEREIGNTY THEORY 
By the mid-twentieth century, the public guardianship notion expanded 
to encompass states' assertion of antitrust and related price-fixing 
claims.232 Indeed, just as air and water pollution were issues of public 
interest during the early industrial period of the early 1900s, price-fixing 
229. Id. at 209. 
230. Id. 
231. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 
432-33, 474 (1995) (observing the nuisance and water rights suits deviated from common 
law but operated "squarely within the area of health, safety, and welfare encompassed by 
even limited views of state regulatory power"); see also HORWITZ, supra note 173, at 27-28 
(citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONIE, COMMENTARIES *219). 
232. Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 443-44 (1945). 
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and market manipulations became a regulatory focus for the consumer 
state in the mid-twentieth century-particularly following criminal price-
fixing convictions in the electrical equipment industry in 1961 .233 
In the late 1960s, several states attempted to bring treble-damages anti-
trust claims either on behalf of citizen-consumers, based on purported 
injuries to the whole economy of the state.234 The most important of 
these was an antitrust action by Hawaii against Standard Oil, "on behalf 
of consumers" and for alleged injury to the state's economy and prosper-
ity.235 It included a class action claim, as well as a parens patriae claim. 236 
The case reached the Supreme Court, forcing the Court to evaluate the 
quasi-sovereignty doctrine in the context of market injury. 
The case offers an important example of a state relying purely on a 
common law form of parens patriae power to seek damages and injunc-
tive relief in antitrust.237 The Court allowed the state to seek injunctive 
relief, but not damages on behalf of its citizens.238 The Court vaguely 
invoked the Sovereignty Transference theory, based on the parens patriae 
doctrine's alleged "deriv[ation]from the English constitutional sys-
tem. '239 In so doing, it shored up what has now become the modern my-
thology of American parens patriae doctrine: the states acting as quasi-
sovereign heirs of the English King's duty to act as guardian of the whole 
realm, without any hint that any of the King's representatives ever en-
gaged in mass-tort litigation.240 An alleged prerogative to supervise chari-
ties (later constrained by Parliament), here morphed into mass-tort 
litigation, conferring a false historical pedigree that never really existed. 
The Court again bypassed the opportunity to examine the history of 
transference during the Framing Era. It overlooked the complex history 
of the charity cases discussing what statutory or common law powers 
were actually received. It instead replicated the mythological origin from 
nineteenth century cases. Modern U.S. courts continue to assert that, in 
the absence of a royal person to serve as parens patriae, states in our 
federal system "received" the guardian function of the King.241 
233. See Malina & Blechman, supra note 14, at 193 (discussing "the avalanche of litiga-
tion" that followed the convictions). 
234. Id. at 193-94 & n.7 (cataloging cases filed by Hawaii, Michigan, California, Kansas, 
New Jersey, Illinois, and New York in 1969). 
235. Id. at 196 (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 980, 984 n.4 (D. Ha-
waii 1969)). 
236. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 255 (1972). 
237. Cox, supra note 8, at 2329-30. 
238. Id. Professor Cox observes that Congress responded to the decision by amending 
the Clayton Act, "to authorize state attorneys general to 'bring a civil action in the name of 
such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such State.. to secure 
monetary relief."' Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2012)). 
239. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 257. 
240. See id. 
241. Id.; accord California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 776 (9th Cir. 1973) ("It is 
true that in the United States this royal prerogative function of the king has passed to the 
states."). 
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In this way, courts treat quasi-sovereignty in parens patriae doctrine as 
a modern, fictionalized reworking of the Sovereignty Transference the-
ory.242 In Standard Oil, the Court correctly recognized that parens patriae 
had morphed in American courts far beyond any historical application in 
eighteenth century England.243 It did not, however, recognize that this 
morphed quasi-sovereign power has nothing whatsoever to do with 
whatever royal prerogative may have once existed in England prior to the 
Statute of Elizabeth-or question why any sovereign power over charities 
would imply a power to bring mass-tort litigation of all varieties. 
By the mid-twentieth century, Louisiana v. Texas had been reinter-
preted by the Court to stand for the proposition that parens patriae suits 
on behalf of a state's citizens are a proper state function. 244 A state's right 
to sue as parens patriae to protect its quasi-sovereign interest had become 
an unquestionable feature of statehood, though the Court struggled with 
whether any particular injury at issue was compensable to the state itself, 
as opposed to the citizens. 245 
Despite its historical trappings, the modern American parens patriae 
doctrine appears to have virtually no genuine connection to any royal 
prerogative.2 46 Indeed, in Alfred L. Snapp & Sons v. Puerto Rico in 1982, 
the Court finally seemed to concede that the English power of the Crown 
at common law is disconnected from the modern American applications 
of parens patriae.2 47 The Court nevertheless asserted that the sovereignty 
narrative still has force through "a 'quasi-sovereign' interest, which is a 
judicial construct that does not lend itself to a simple or exact defini-
tion.' '2 48 This is the closest the Court has come to admitting that the 
early-twentieth century cases had invented the historical foundation of 
quasi-sovereignty narrative and its historical antecedents are a fiction. 
The historical mythology nevertheless persists in the lower courts. 249 
The idea of the quasi-sovereign interest is difficult to separate from its 
historical mythology: it is supposed to reflect the interest a sovereign 
power (king) would have had, made quasi only because the states are not 
truly sovereign in our constitutional federal system. Stripped of the his-
torical trappings related to the guardianship of charities, infants, idiots, 
242. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 
(1982) ("This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every 
State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature ..... 
243. See Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 257. 
244. Id. at 258-59. 
245. Id. 
246. See Curtis, supra note 41, at 907-08 (noting that when acting in a quasi-sovereign 
capacity, a state's purpose is the protection of the well-being of its entire populace and its 
economy, not just the protection of a dependent class). 
247. 458 U.S. at 600 ("This common-law approach [the King's prerogative], however, 
has relatively little to do with the concept of parens patriae standing that has developed in 
American law."). 
248. Id. at 601. 
249. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 425 (5th Cir. 
2008) (discussing the King's royal prerogative in an antitrust suit while concluding the doc-
trine has "expanded considerably"). 
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and lunatics, the problem becomes defining the remaining content of the 
quasi-sovereignty. 
Ultimately, the Court pointed out that the quasi-sovereign interest to 
litigate runs parallel to the state's interest in legislation: the state's power 
to sue is determined, at least in part, by "whether the injury [to the health 
and welfare of its citizens] is one that the State, if it could, would likely 
attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers. ' 250 The 
state's amorphous interest includes "the health and well-being-both 
physical and economic-of its residents in general," as well as an interest 
"in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal 
2 51 system." 
The nature of the state's quasi-sovereign interest concept has con-
founded courts attempting to distinguish permissible state interests from 
impermissible citizen interests. This has drawn criticism from scholars and 
practitioners.252 The recognition of a public interest distinct from the pri-
vate citizen one, though, is precisely what separates the American parens 
patriae from the doctrine known to Blackstone-this is the uniquely 
American feature of parens patriae that could not have been inherited 
from England.25 3 
Parens patriae actions have become commonplace features of mass tort 
litigation, especially in consumer protection and antitrust cases. 25 4 The 
past decade has experienced an explosion of litigation brought by state 
250. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. 
251. Id. 
252. Lemos, supra note 9, at 492-93 (describing the "fuzzy line" between forms of 
parens patriae litigation); Ratliff, supra note 8, at 1851 ("'Quasi-sovereign' is one of those 
loopy concepts that comes along often enough to remind us that appellate courts some-
times lose their moorings and drift off into the ether. It is a meaningless term absolutely 
bereft of utility."); id. at 1852 (discussing the "blurry" outline of quasi-sovereignty); id. at 
1857 (concluding that the doctrine is "too vague to permit any predictability"); Malina & 
Blechman, supra note 14, at 214 (describing state parens patriae actions under this doctrine 
as "Robin Hoods" who are "misled by the ambiguity of the term 'parens patriae' and are 
propounding a legal theory based on a confusion of the disparate notions of the royal 
prerogative and quasi-sovereignty"); Jim Ryan & Don R. Sampen, Suing on Behalf of the 
State: A Parens Patriae Primer, 86 ILL. B.J. 684, 687 (1998) ("There is clearly tension, if not 
outright inconsistency, among some of the cases allowing and disallowing individual relief 
in parens patriae suits."); Curtis, supra note 41, at 914 (describing the confusion regarding 
American precedent discussing quasi-sovereign interests). 
253. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
254. See, e.g., Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions 
in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys General, 68 FORDI AM L. 
REV. 361, 362-64 (1999) (describing broad range of parens patriae antitrust suits involving 
automobiles, automotive products, food processors, real estate, milk, consumer electronics, 
footwear, toys, cemetery plots, petroleum products, garbage carting, and cable television 
services); Jay L. Himes, State Parens Patriae Authority: The State Attorney General's Au-
thority, INs'r. FOR LAW & ECON. POLICY SYMPOSIUM 12-14 (2004), https://web.archive.org/ 
web/201.60203081715/h ttp://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-comminttees/at-state/pdf/pub-
lications/other-pubs/parens.pdf; see generally Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics 
Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014) (antitrust); California ex rel. Lockyer v. Safeway, Inc., 371 F. 
Supp. 2d 1179 (2005), affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded sub. nom. to 651 F.3d 1118 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (antitrust); Nevada v. Bank of America Corp., 672 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(consumer fraud); California v. General Motors LLC, 69 F. Supp. 3d 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(vehicle ignition defects); Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit, New Mexico v. Volk-
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attorneys general on behalf of consumers, dramatically affecting the na-
ture of product regulation.255 Parens patriae litigation has become rou-
tine in environmental protection, and even civil rights enforcement. 256 
All of these forms of parens patriae actions now frequently obtain money 
damages awards as well as injunctive relief-making it quite clear that 
parens patriae is no longer a creature of equity (deriving its legitimacy 
257 from the historical power of Court of Chancery in England). 
While states now sue as plaintiffs to enforce more varied forms of pub-
lic rights than they did in the nineteenth century, they also continue to 
use the power to bring actions for public nuisance that echo the kinds of 
claims brought in the post-bellum period. For example, on June 20, 2016, 
New Mexico sued Colorado, invoking the Supreme Court's original juris-
diction, for a public nuisance claim based on a major spill of toxic fluid 
from the Gold King Mine in southwestern Colorado into the Animas 
River.258 The spill allegedly sent 880,000 pounds of arsenic, lead, cad-
mium, copper, mercury, and zine, and three million gallons of mine was-
tewater into the waterway, where it then flowed into northern New 
Mexico, fouling drinking water.259 The state alleges the spill will cause 
long-term health risks to its own citizens, including farmers, ranchers, and 
recreational users of the river, and harm the river's ecosystem.260 It ex-
pressly includes a public nuisance claim, along with other statutory 
claims.2 61 This suit is very much in the tradition of the post-bellum parens 
patriae public nuisance cases. It is also consistent with the modern trend 
2 62 
of seeking both equitable relief and monetary damages.
This modern version of the old-fashioned public nuisance parens pa-
triae litigation can be contrasted with a different breed of modern litiga-
tion having no nineteenth-century analog: consumer litigation brought by 
state attorneys general against private defendants for economic injuries 
to citizens. For example, states sued several book publishers and Apple 
swagen Group of America, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-03007, 2016 WL 4059280 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 
2016) (vehicle emissions litigation). 
255. Gifford, supra note 29, at 914. 
256. Himes, supra note 254, at 13 & n.66 (discussing state authority to sue under federal 
anti-discrimination statutes). 
257. Id. at 13-14 & n.67 (the "state's interest in preventing harm to its citizens by anti-
trust violations is, indeed, a prime instance of the interest that the parens patriae can vindi-
cate by obtaining damages and/or an injunction") (discussing e.g., Insurance Antitrust 
Litigation, 938 F.2d 919, 927 (9th Cir. 1991, aff 'd in part, rev'd in part sub. nom. Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.764 (1993)); Maine v. MN Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 
1101-02 (D. Me. 1973) (recovering damages for environmental injury); Selma Pressure 
Treating Co., v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co. of America, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1601, 271 
Cal. Rptr. 596, 606 (1990) (affirming right to pursue money damages award)). 
258. Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, Bill of Complaint, and Brief in Sup-
port of Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 1-2, New Mexico v. Colorado, No. 220147 
ORG (2016), https://www.env.nm.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/01./160604-for-filing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UUA7-ZKER]. 
259. Id. at 2. 
260. Id. at 3. 
261. Id. at 45-48. 
262. See id. at 51 (seeking compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages, as well 
as equitable relief). 
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over electronic book price manipulation in 2013, obtaining over $500 mil-
lion in settlements for the benefit of consumers. 263 A new litigation regu-
latory structure has emerged from a patchwork of settlements with 
manufacturers, and sometimes entire industries, in the wake of parens 
patriae actions. 264 Such suits have transformed regulation of products as 
disparate as cigarettes, firearms, automobiles, consumer goods, and phar-
maceutical drugs.2 65 State quasi-sovereign interests built a new business 
regulatory system based on mass tort litigation. 
What began in Louisiana v. Texas as an inquiry into the Supreme 
Court's original jurisdiction in a dispute between two states has evolved 
into an all-purpose state power used to sue private defendants for mass 
266 tort claims, even aggregating the claims of individual victims. 
C. THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY "ALL PURPOSE" STATE POWER TO 
LITIGATE MASS TORT CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF CITIZENS 
By 2000, scholars had observed that state and federal courts "uniformly 
recognize a state's authority to sue, as parens patriae, to vindicate the 
state's and its citizens' interests." 267 This was the result of rapid evolution 
of the doctrine toward the end of the twentieth century. 
Parens patriae went through a remarkable transformation in the multi-
state tobacco litigation in the 1990s, in which many states brought novel 
tort claims to sue cigarette manufacturers for harm to the common good, 
through aggregated harm to their citizen smokers resulting in increased 
health costs for the states themselves. 268 In this model, the physical harm 
that was sustained by the smokers then transmitted to the state through 
2 6 9 financial costs.
Causation requirements often make recovery for individual victims of 
products like cigarettes impossible-indeed, individual plaintiffs lost vir-
tually every personal injury case brought against tobacco companies prior 
to the states' parens patriae litigation.270 The states were fairly successful 
suing to recover financial costs incurred from smokers' addiction though. 
Professors Ieyoub and Eisenberg have argued that the states' involve-
ment in tobacco litigation turned the tide against the defendants, result-
ing in the first plaintiff-verdicts in California, Oregon, and Florida.27 1 
263. See Albanese, supra note 15; Hood, supra note 16. 
264. Gifford, supra note 29, at 914-15. 
265. Id.; see also id. at 930 ("Regulatory litigation is an attempt on the part of the state 
attorney general to expand the boundaries of the common law with the explicit purpose of 
regulating an industry . 
266. See id. at 931. 
267. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1864. 
268. Gifford, supra note 29, at 931-32. 
269. Id. at 932-33. 
270. leyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1860 ("Before the states' [parens patriae] 
litigation, the tobacco industry had not lost a smoking case .... ); id. at 1860 n.1 ("Plain-
tiffs previously had won only two trials of 813 filed claims against tobacco companies, with 
the two trial victories reversed on appeal."). 
271. Id. at 1860. 
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This highlights that states have been able to win recoveries through 
parens patriae that individual citizens often could not win on their 
own.2 72 This is true even in the absence of statutory authority for the 
parens patriae power: lower courts continue to rely instead on the com-
mon law sovereignty narrative articulated by the Supreme Court when 
statutory authority fails. 
For example, in Texas v. American Tobacco Company, the district 
court understood the Supreme Court's sovereignty narrative to create a 
common law right for states to bring suit to protect their quasi-sovereign 
interests.273 The state sued the cigarette maker for strict products liability, 
breach of warranty, negligence, fraud, and misrepresentation.274 Uncon-
strained by the mythological royal prerogative, the district court reasoned 
that these quasi-sovereign interests "evolve and change with time," per-
mitting a case-by-case definition of the scope of those interests.27 5 The 
only limit this lower court perceived was that states could not use this 
power as mere nominal parties asserting interests belonging to someone 
276 
else.
Parens patriae is now operating unfettered by any constraints related 
to its mythological historical origin. A purely judicial construct, state in-
terests can apparently now be anything courts deem worth protecting. 
Nevertheless, the false historical trappings continue to be invoked to con-
fer legitimacy to the concept, even when they lack any meaningful con-
nection to it.277 
Against this tide, there has been a stream of resistance to this common 
law expansion of parens patriae authority. In the early 1970s, for exam-
ple, the Ninth Circuit rejected permitting a state to bring an antitrust suit 
based on such common law in California v. Frito-Lay.278 The court rea-
soned that legislation authorizing a state to sue as a plaintiff was essential 
to expand the limited historical reach of the parens patriae doctrine at 
common law. 27 9 In other words, expansion required a source of positive 
law. Although not noticed by the lower court, this notion impliedly re-
flects the old spirit of Marshall's opinion in Baptist Association, looking 
for a source of positive law for the power. It is, however, entirely out-of-
step with the common law development of the parens patriae doctrine in 
272. See id.; see also Gifford, supra note 29, at 933. 
273. 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962-63 (E.D. Tex. 1997). 
274. Id. at 965. 
275. Id. at 962 ("It is without question that these interests can evolve and change with 
time, and as such, the Court made very clear its desire to maintain a definition that is 
conducive to a case-by-case analysis."). 
276. Id. 
277. See, e.g., id. at 962-63 ("It is clear to the Court that the State can maintain this 
action pursuant to its quasi-sovereign interests found at common law.") (emphasis added). 
278. 474 F.2d 774, 777-78 (9th Cir. 1973). 
279. Id. at 777. In the wake of the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the state's power to bring 
an antitrust claim on behalf of its citizens, Congress amended the Clayton Act to expressly 
permit parens patriae actions. See H.R. RiP. No. 94-499, at 6-8 (1975), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2575-78; Texas v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 709 F.2d 1024, 1025 & n.1 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (discussing legislative history). 
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the post-bellum period. 280 
More recently, the Fifth Circuit questioned Louisiana's quasi-sovereign 
interest in a parens patriae suit against insurers who allegedly manipu-
lated the state's insurance market to inflate premiums after Hurricane 2
Katrina. 281 The insurers disputed Louisiana's quasi-sovereign interest. 82 
The state's standing to sue was not at issue in the case, as the only dispute 
before the court was the removability of the suit to federal court under 
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). 283 The court analyzed removabil-
ity through the lens of the quasi-sovereignty narrative in Snapp.284 As the 
Fifth Circuit concluded the state was only a nominal party to the insur-
ance litigation, with the policyholders as the real parties in interest, it 
treated the matter as aggregate litigation presenting claims of the citizens 
themselves, not any quasi-sovereign interest of the state.285 Other circuits 
disagreed with this approach, refusing to convert parens patriae actions 
into aggregate litigation with the citizens as real parties in interest.286 Ul-
timately, the CAFA question was settled in 2014 by the Supreme Court, 
which unanimously held parens patriae actions are not removable under 
CAFA as "mass actions. '287 The Court, however, based its analysis on 
CAFA's jurisdictional language, not the nature of parens patriae (and 
had nothing to say about the state's quasi-sovereign interest in the 
case) .288 
One scholarly approach suggests that a proper understanding of the 
quasi-sovereign interest paradigm results in a conclusion that "the state's 
interest may be parasitic on the interests of individual citizens. ' 289 In 
other words, a state can sue in its parens patriae capacity to redress pri-
vate interests that are widespread enough to implicate the state's interest 
in the welfare of its citizens.290 This principle has maximum force where 
the individual harms may otherwise go unredressed. 291 Indeed, the core 
precedent defining the doctrine from the turn of the century illustrated 
the problem during the industrialization of the economy: regional pollu-
280. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
281. See Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 422-23 (5th Cir. 
2008), overruled by Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014). 
282. Id. at 425-26. 
283. Id. at 423. 
284. Id. at 425-26 (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 
U.S. 592, 600 (1982)). 
285. Id. at 428-29. 
286. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 209 (2d Cir. 2013); LG Display 
Co., Ltd. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768, 773-74 (7th Cir. 2011). 
287. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 745-46 (2014). 
(reversing Fifth Circuit's mode of analysis). 
288. See id. As Professor Lemos has aptly observed, the nominal party issue has no 
relevance to the parens patriae question. Lemos, supra note 9, at 495 n.38. It is pertinent to 
subject matter jurisdiction in federal court (for purposes of original jurisdiction and diver-
sity jurisdiction), and thus goes to where the suit may be brought, not whether the state has 
the power to bring it at all. [d. 
289. Lemos, supra note 9, at 494. 
290. Id. at 495. 
291. See leyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1874, 1880. 
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tion and rights to clean air and waterways could not have been ade-
quately redressed on an individual level, even though individuals might 
have had private claims.29 2 The parens patriae litigation from that era 
reflected state attempts to regulate these widespread, regional effects in 
the absence of action from Congress. 293 The fulcrum of these suits has 
shifted in the modern era to markets, particularly consumer markets, 
which are often themselves regional or even national, 294 as reflected by 
the modern tactic of banding together multiple states as joint plaintiffs to 
295 pursue such litigation.
Many state statutes now make the state's interest explicit by authoriz-
ing attorneys general to sue on behalf of state citizens for particular 
torts.296 For example, California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) is typ-
ical in that it expressly contemplates enforcement by the Attorney Gen-
eral bringing suit on behalf of injured citizens for, among other things, 
false advertising and fraudulent business practices. 297 However, the states 
have not approached such statutory authority uniformly. 298 
These statutes often implicate the state's standing to assert the claims 
of citizens, but the federal courts have sometimes treated standing to 
bring parens patriae suits as a question of prudential standing (meaning 
not of constitutional magnitude, such that limits are open to revision by 
Congress).2 99 This appears to be no longer viable, in light of the Supreme 
Court's recent retreat from prudential standing. 300 Moreover, where 
292. Id. at 1879. 
293. Id. 
294. See id. 
295. Id. at 1881-82 (discussing thirty-nine states acting jointly in litigation against the 
tobacco industry). 
296. Lemos, supra note 9, at 495-96. 
297. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 17204 (conferring power to bring suit for injunc-
tive relief); see also CAl.. Bus. & PROE. CoD § 16760 (conferring parens patriae authority 
to sue for monetary relief for injuries sustained by the people of California). 
298. As of 2002, in multidistrict litigation involving suits by all fifty states, one district 
court observed that forty-two states and the District of Columbia have some form of 
parens patriae power: 
Fourteen ... states-California, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Colum-
bia, Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia-have expressly conferred parens 
patriae authority. Sixteen states-Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, 
Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming-have 
express statutory authority to represent consumers in a capacity which is the 
functional equivalent of parens patriae. Thirteen states-Alabama, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington-have had state and/ 
or federal courts interpret statutory provisions to effectively grant parens pa-
triae authority or have determined that their attorney general has such au-
thority under state common law. 
In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 386-87 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(citations omitted). The other eight states can apparently bring representative suits on be-
half of their citizens under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. ld. at 387. 
299. Lemos, supra note 9, at 497 & nn.42-43. 
300. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1381-82 
(2014). 
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there is a federal statute conferring such authority (such as the Clayton 
Act), Congress has already spoken and named state attorneys general as 
proper parties to bring suit under that statute. In the absence of such a 
federal statute, however, the common law parens patriae doctrine (with 
its sovereignty narrative) has traditionally filled in the gap. 
There appears to be little meaningful difference in the doctrine be-
tween state and federal courts. Indeed, state courts appear to have appro-
3priated the quasi-sovereignty narrative, with its historical mythology. 01 
Part IV offers an alternative narrative to explain the American devel-
opment of the doctrine based on the states' historic police powers. 
IV. EXCAVATING AN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATION FOR THE STATES' 
PARENS PATRIAE POWER 
Although the Supreme Court has conceded the contours of parens pa-
triae common law authority are judge-made, cases legitimize the doctrine 
by invoking the mythology of the royal prerogative, allegedly transmitted 
to the states following the American Revolution. 30 2 As explained in Parts 
II and III, the historical narratives ultimately fail to account for the mod-
ern form of the doctrine. This Part reconstructs the doctrine independent 
of any royal prerogatives or ancient European traditions. It argues the 
parens patriae power is best understood with reference to the evolution 
of the states' historic police powers in the American constitutional 
structure. 
The expansion of parens patriae in the late-nineteenth century reflects 
the expansion of state police powers: they move in tandem, with parens 
patriae mirroring then-extent views of police powers. Stripped of the sov-
ereignty narratives connecting parens patriae with powers of the Crown 
at common law, the doctrine can be reconstructed as a direct reflection of 
evolving understandings of the state's police powers in our constitutional 
system. States possess the power to sue to enforce norms within the 
sphere of their police powers, and as the substantive police powers 
evolved, so did their related parens patriae powers. 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE STATES' POLICE POWERS 
It is axiomatic that our constitutional structure contains a sphere of 
authority where Congress has declined to impose federal lawmaking 
power, even where Article I might allow it to do so. In this unclaimed 
area of governance, the states have residual power.30 3 This space exists in 
301. See leyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 13, 1864 ("Parens patriae doctrine in the 
United States generally follows the same principles in federal and state courts. State court 
cases discussing parens patriae regularly rely on federal precedents. Federal doctrine is 
therefore a natural starting place for describing the parens patriae doctrine."). 
302. See supra notes 238-239 and accompanying text. 
303. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387 (1798) ("It appears to me a self-evident 
proposition, that the several State Legislatures retain all the powers of legislation, dele-
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the gaps between federal lawmaking, where "[s]tates [have] great latitude 
under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, 
'30 4 limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons. 
Soon after the Framing, the Court recognized that some state legisla-
tion might be "contrary to the great first principles of the social com-
pact," and thus not merit being called a "law" at all. 30 5 These first 
principles included the people of the United States creating their consti-
tutions and forms of government "to establish justice, to promote the 
general welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty; and to protect their 
persons and property from violence. ' 30 6 These purposes, according to 
Justice Chase, determine the terms of the social compact and the founda-
tion of legislative power.30 7 
In the early years of the Republic, there was scant Supreme Court con-
cern with state legislation largely because the Marshall Court had 
shielded state legislation from rigorous review under the Bill of Rights, 
leaving the states relatively free to legislate. 30 8 The Court's jurisprudence 
on police powers thus took many decades to emerge. Our constitutional 
jurisprudence developing the concept of the state's historic police powers 
finally coalesced in the middle nineteenth century.30 9 
According to Professor Morton Horwitz, prior to the 1850s, "jurists did 
not generally derive the regulatory powers of the state over health, safety, 
and morals from notions of inherent state power. '310 This changed 
quickly between 1850-1870,311 about the same time the Universal Sover-
eignty theory emerged in the parens patriae context. 312 Horwitz observed 
that "[b]y the 1870s, police power had become the standard legal cate-
gated to them by the State Constitutions; which are not EXPRESSLY taken away by the 
Constitution of the United States. The establishing courts of justice, the appointment of 
Judges, and the making regulations for the administration of justice, within each State, 
according to its laws, on all subjects not entrusted to the Federal Government, appears to 
me to be the peculiar and exclusive province, and duty of the State Legislatures ...."); see 
also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEx. L. 
Riv. 1321, 1326 (2001); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. 
REv. 1349, 1385 (2001); Margaret S. Thomas, Constraining the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure Through the Federalism Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 16 N.Y.U. J. L-cits. & 
PUB. Po'xY 187, 236-37 (2013). 
304. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
305. Calder, 3 U.S. at 388. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. The social compact premise that was fundamental to the Framing era reveals a 
fatal flaw in the sovereignty narrative of parens patriae precedent: the states did not inherit 
royal prerogatives or guardianship roles of any King; rather, the people through the state 
and federal constitutions, conferred power to govern. The people were the ultimate source 
of power, not the Crown. See id. at 387. The source of the parens patriae power thus has to 
flow from the constitutional structures created through this social compact. See id. at 
387-88. 
308. Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era 
Police Powers Jurisprudence 48-49 (1993). 
309. Id. at 46-47; HORWITZ, supra note 173, at 27 (discussing the emergence of the 
concept of state police powers in the 1850s). 
310. HORWITZ, supra note 173, at 27. 
311. Id. 
312. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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gory for talking about the state's regulatory power over the health, safety, 
and morals of its citizens. '3 13 Initially, the concepts for these early police 
powers derived from common law concepts of nuisance.314 That changed 
around the turn of the century, as the police power concept matured. Part 
IV.B will show that as the understanding of police powers evolved, so too 
did the parens patriae litigation. 
B. PARENS PATRIAE AS A MANIFESTATION OF THE STATE'S 
HISTORIC POLICE POWERS 
The canon of state-as-plaintiff cases from the early twentieth century is 
a virtually perfect mirror of the then-extant legal understandings of the 
states' police powers. Rather than reflecting some imaginary English pre-
rogative of the king regarding charities that was received at the time of 
the Revolution, all of the cases demonstrate examples of state police 
powers firmly rooted in our constitutional federalism, at particular mo-
ments of social history. 
This linkage can be illustrated by re-examining the emergence of state 
involvement in mass tort litigation in the early twentieth century. Com-
mencing with Louisiana v. Texas in 1900, a state attempted to defend its 
own economy against an embargo of commerce and travel.315 Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper, a suit about a copper plant's discharge of sulfuric acid 
from a smoke stack flowing into Georgia, shows a state protecting public 
health and welfare against poisonous fumes.316 Missouri v. Illinois, a dis-
pute over Chicago's discharge of sewage down-river, similarly emphasizes 
a state's power to protect the health and welfare of its people.
31 7 
In this era, a judicial constitutional construct emerged that focused on 
the relationship between states and their polity: state police powers de-
pended upon articulation of a "relat[ionship] to the welfare of the com-
munity as a whole," rather than advancement of "purely 'private' 
interests. '3 18 In 1904, Professor Ernst Freund articulated the nature of 
this power, as it had evolved in the cases, in two key aspects: the state 
police power "aims directly to secure and promote the public welfare, 
and it does so by restraint and compulsion."'3 9 1 He reasoned that the 
power was elastic in that it reflects social, economic, and political condi-
tions.320 Maintaining minimal standards of physical well-being was under-
313. HORWITZ, supra note 173, at 27; see also GILLMAN, supra note 308, at 49 ("An 
exercise of legislative powers would be considered valid only if it could reasonably be justi-
fied as contributing to the general welfare."). 
314. HoRwIrz, supra note 173, at 27-28. 
315. 176 U.S. 1, 2, 4 (1900). 
316. 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907). 
317. 180 U.S. 208, 211-12, 214 (1901). 
318. GILLMAN, supra note 308, at 49, 55 (observing this doctrine was already well en-
trenched in the nation's courts by the time of the Civil War). 
319. ERNSTr FREUND, Tii POLICE POWER PUBLIC POLICY AND CONsTITUTIONA 
Rtc;iTs 3 (1904). 
320. See id. at 3, 7 (summarizing the primary social interests at stake as including safety, 
order, morals, economic interests, and non-material and political interests). 
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stood to be a core element of the public welfare. 321 This kind of police 
32 2 power vested in the states as a fundamental duty of government.
Professor Freund identified a related duty within the police powers to 
care for fundamental social interests, particularly "the care and control of 
dependent classes, especially of minors. '32 3 This aspect of the state's po-
lice powers obviously echoes the ancient royal prerogative to care for 
"infants, idiots, and lunatics" in the sovereignty theory of parens patriae 
authority. 32 4 The location of this duty of guardianship in the state's his-
toric police powers hints at the direct relationship between parens pa-
triae, in all its manifestations, and those police powers in our 
constitutional system. 
Other historic police powers foreshadow the controversial growth of 
parens patriae. For example, Professor Freund further identified a contro-
versy surrounding the extension of the state's police powers to protect 
economic interests.32 5 Writing in 1904, almost contemporaneously with 
the dawn of the Lochner era, he concluded that government intervention 
to exercise "care and control of economic interests" would be a form of 
"favoritism or oppression. '326 A year later, the Supreme Court decided 
Lochner v. New York, striking down New York's law limiting bakers to 
ten hours of work per day.3 2 7 The Court rejected the state's argument 
that the law protected the health of the bakers (a core function of the 
state's historic police power) and famously concluded the law was an "un-
reasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right [and lib-
erty] of the individual to [contract]. '32 8 Freund's skepticism of economic 
intervention in his discussion of police powers in the treatise was thus 
sensitive to the emerging zeitgeist. Foreshadowing Lochner, Freund ar-
gued that "the idea of due process is freely applied to legislation, and 
means with regard to it conformity to the settled maxims of free 
329 
government. 
Against the economic tampering on behalf of favored classes, he distin-
guished other less controversial forms of police power over economic in-
321. Id. at 7. 
322. THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY & VIcToRi H. LANE, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE 
AMERICAN UNION 831 (7th ed., 1903) (observing the police power "has been left with the 
individual States"); id. at 837 (describing the police power as being limited to the regula-
tion of "comfort, safety, or welfare of society"). 
323. FREUND, supra note 319, at 7. 
324. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47. 
325. FRIUND, supra note 319, at 8 ("That the organized community should afford its 
members protection against physical danger and moral scandal, is generally admitted, and 
only the question to what extent this protection should go, is controverted. It is otherwise 
as to economic interests."); accord COOLEY & LANE, supra note 322, at 856 (describing the 
distinction between lawful police regulation and "interference with commerce" as "exceed-
ingly dim and shadowy"). 
326. FREUND, supra note 319, at 8. 
327. 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905). 
328. Id. at 56. 
329. FREUND, supra note 319, at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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terests. 330 The wave of parens patriae suits in the early twentieth century 
to combat out-of-state air and water pollution fouling areas within state 
borders fit comfortably within even the most restrictive view of police 
powers of the Lochner era.331 These were classic "health, safety, and wel-
of the state's police powers.332 fare" matters at the core 
That era's embrace of the state's role protecting public health, safety, 
and welfare became the foundation for modern health-related parens pa-
triae suits, like the states' tobacco litigation, propelling the doctrine far 
beyond common law public nuisance. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, in 
1905, 333 the Supreme Court upheld a state's compulsory vaccination 
law. 334 Jacobson was the doctrinal ancestor of tobacco parens patriae 
suits in the 1990s by states bringing claims for injuries to their citizens. In 
upholding Massachusetts' vaccine law in Jacobson, the Court ruled that 
"[t]he mode or manner [of exercising the state's police power] is within 
the discretion of the state" so long as the Constitution of the United 
States is not contravened. 335 
Jacobson's recognition of police powers justifying compulsory vaccina-
tion should be read in the context of the Lochner v. New York decision, 
which was handed down the same year. 336 Lochner famously stands as 
the high-water mark in constraining state police power.337 To reconcile 
the tension, the Court relied on a categorical distinction between "true" 
exercises of police powers and illegitimate ones-never mind that New 
York's legislature had health concerns about the effect long work weeks 
had on its bakers in Lochner. Professor Morton Horwitz's analysis of the 
analytic reasoning mode in this era suggests a legal process dominated by 
rigid, categorical thinking: "[C]lear, distinct, bright-line classifications of 
legal phenomena. ' 338 Rather than thinking about police powers on a con-
tinuum, nineteenth century reasoning divided them into "differences of 
kind. '339 Massachusetts' interest in vaccinating its citizens implicated a 
kind of public interest that differed from New York's interest in the pri-
vate working conditions of its bakers. One was allowed, and the other 
was not. 
330. Id. at 9. 
331. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 231, at 474 ("When the Court inaugurated 
what we have identified as police power standing in [original jurisdiction] nuisance and 
water rights cases, it . . . operated squarely within the area of health, safety, and welfare 
encompassed by even limited views of state regulatory power."). 
332. See id. 
333. 197 U.S. 11, 11 (1905); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 346 (1997) 
(reaffirming Jacobson). 
334. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35. 
335. Id. at 25. 
336. 198 U.S. 45, 45 (1905). 
337. Id. at 64 ("It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws 
of this character, while passed under what is claimed to be the police power for the purpose 
of protecting the public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives.") (em-
phasis added). 
338. HORwITZ, supra note 173, at 17. 
339. Id. 
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This understanding of police powers in the Lochner era translated to 
the states' parens patriae power, and the Court rejected the parens pa-
triae cases implicating economic interests benefiting particular favored 
classes. In other words, the Court was suspicious if a state exercised 
guardianship of select, privileged citizens rather than the general public 
interest. For example, New Hampshire v. Louisiana involved a dispute 
over assignment of overdue bonds issued by Louisiana but held by re-
sidents of New Hampshire and New York.340 The latter states had en-
acted laws enabling their citizens to assign the bonds to the state attorney 
general so that he could sue in the state's name to recover the money 
owed, evading the Eleventh Amendment's constitutional protection for 
Louisiana.34 1 Although the Court's reasoning turned on the precision of 
its own limited original jurisdiction, the act of "assuming the prosecution 
of debts owing by the other state to its citizens, ' 342 fell outside the frame-
work of the core police powers, as the concept was then understood. In 
Freund's helpful terms, New York and New Hampshire were working for 
the benefit of a particular group of bondholders, an area he understood 
powers in that era. 343 to be outside the police 
Similarly, when the Court held that Massachusetts lacked parens pa-
344 
triae authority to sue to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional, 
the holding ultimately reflected a judgment about the state's police pow-
ers not encompassing any authority to interfere with its citizens' relation-
ship with the federal government. 345 Such a power would obviously 
contravene the constitution's structure, and thus would not fall within the 
state's own police powers 
After the Court's eventual repudiation of Lochner's restrictive view of 
police powers, the states' police powers quickly expanded. 346 Rapid social 
change challenged the viability of the era's rigid categories, and they be-
gan to fall apart.347 By the 1990s, the states' tool of choice to protect 
public health against nicotine addiction was litigation. Both the early vac-
cine laws and the modern tobacco litigation reflect the same species of 
police power: the states simply used different tools to accomplish the 
public heath ends. Indeed, the states' police powers have historically been 
especially strong in this area. Professor Edward Richards has pointed out 
that by the late 1990s, in the area of public health, in "almost all cases 
where the extent of police power has been at issue, the state and federal 
340. 108 U.S. 76, 78 (1883). 
341. Id. at 76. 
342. Id. at 91. 
343. FREUND, supra note 319, at 743-44. 
344. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923). 
345. See id. 
346. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 231, at 474 ("With the demise of Lochner, how-
ever, the Court largely abandoned the attempt to set limits on the appropriate ends of 
government."). 
347. Hoiiwirz, supra note 173, at 30 ("[A]ny categorical distinction between the health 
of a worker and the conditions of industrial life became ever more difficult to maintain."). 
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courts [] found in favor of the state. '348 The states' success with ex-
panding parens patriae power to mass torts in the tobacco litigation is 
thus not surprising when framed in the context of health-related police 
powers. 
This expansion of police powers occurred both in the context of the 
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction (state suing state) and in the con-
text of traditional litigation (state suing private defendants). For example, 
in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, Pennsylvania acted to protect its con-
sumers by bringing suit over a neighboring state's restriction on natural 
gas distributions. 349 Similarly, Georgia sued railroads for conspiring to 
economically discriminate against the state.350 The Supreme Court also 
approved Puerto Rico's use of the power to sue employers for discrimi-
nating against its citizens in Snapp.351 
Snapp's approach to trying to define quasi-sovereign interests in the 
parens patriae context ultimately devolves into a recitation of police pow-
ers, though the Court did not call them that: "[T]he health and well-be-
ing-both physical and economic-of its residents in general. '352 When 
the Court tried to identify the sovereign interest by suggesting it ought to 
be the kind a state could address through legislative power,353 it was 
again nodding toward the police powers that are the essence of the state 
lawmaking domain. The Court's focus on the generality of the effects of 
the state action similarly echoes the Lochner era understanding of the 
police power described by Freund: namely, relating to the good of the 3 
community, as opposed to the benefit of favored classes. 54 
The evolution of the parens patriae power to encompass antitrust and 
consumer deception reflects the evolution in the twentieth century of an 
understanding of the market as a community good. After Lochner's de-
mise during the New Deal era, state regulation of economic interests be-
came routine. By the 1970s, courts began extending the parens patriae 
power to antitrust. In the 1990s, when they extended it to consumer pro-
tection, state regulation in those areas pursuant to the police powers was 
universally accepted. The expansion of parens patriae power thus can be 
seen as running in tandem with the social context defining contemporary 
understanding of police powers regarding economic markets. 
348. Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice: A 
Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in ER-
ISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEAiLT L. 201, 201 (1999); see 
also id. at 206 ("[T]he United States Supreme Court has not substantially limited the police 
power as it relates to public health disease control."). Professor Richards observes that 
police powers related to public health had deep roots in the colonial experience with wide-
spread disease, particularly yellow fever. Id. at 204-05. 
349. 262 U.S. 553, 591-92 (1923). 
350. Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 444, 450 (1945). 
351. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607-08 
(1982). 
352. Id. at 607. 
353. Id. 
354. See id. at 607-08; FREUND, supra note 319, at 5. 
2016] Parens Patriae and The States' Historic Police Power 807 
The regulatory aspect of parens patriae observed by Professors Gill-
man and Cox reflects state commitments to exercising police powers for 
specific kinds of harm to the public welfare (in the sense of harm to mar-
kets, health, and collective economies). 355 Litigation became a form of 
corporate censure by state governments, and the resulting settlement 
agreements became a form of governmental control. 
The Court has sometimes discussed the police powers in the context of 
creating standing to bring suit in federal court.356 In reality, though, these 
powers have less to do with standing to bring a matter before a federal 
court than they do with the state's power to bring suit at all. They relate 
to the scope of the state's powers in its own regulatory sphere, and for 
parens patriae, they are a reflection of law enforcement powers. 357 Re-
striction of parens patriae power would therefore not be a procedural 
reform comparable to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; it would be a 
substantive curtailment of state regulatory authority in the sphere of its 
own police powers. Such a reform would be a major shift in the balance 
of federalism. 
C. RECONSTRUCTING MODERN PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE 
THROUGH THE POLICE POWER 
This Article has argued that parens patriae has little basis in the histori-
cal narrative that courts have often invoked to justify the doctrine's exis-
tence, and state assertions of the power instead evolved to reflect 
changing understandings of state police powers. Nevertheless, there is 
one feature of modern parens patriae practice that still contains a faint 
echo of the Framing era's disputes over the power to supervise charities 
transferred from England. Many scholars have observed that the practice 
has become largely statutory-meaning state and federal statutes define 
most state powers to seek public compensation in modern practice,35 8 so 
35 9 
that common law parens patriae actions have become exceedingly rare.
Professor Cox has observed that common law assertions of parens patriae 
power have simply become unnecessary in light of expansive modern 
360 
statutory authority for states to sue to protect the public interest.
Professor Cox's exhaustive research on modern public compensation 
practice suggests that a complex web of statutes (state and federal) now 
tend to define state governmental power to sue as guardian of the citi-
355. See GELLMAN, supra note 308, at 48-49; Cox, supra note 8, at 2317-22. 
356. See Snapp, 258 U.S. at 607 ("One helpful indication in determining whether an 
alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to 
sue as parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely 
attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.") (emphasis added); see also 
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 231, at 476-77 (discussing police powers and standing 
in federal court). 
357. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 231, at 477. 
358. Cox, supra note 8, at 2329-30, 2335-36. 
359. Id. at 2328 ("Government enforcers rarely rely on common law parens doctrine for 
public compensation."). 
360. Id. at 2328-29. 
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zens' health, safety and welfare. 361 Defining the state's guardianship role 
in statutes arguably more accurately reflects the English structure of 
power received by the states at the time of Independence in the early 
charity cases: a system of statutory powers that creates a legislative 
framework for courts. England transmitted not the prerogatives of an ab-
solutist monarchy, but the complex powers of King-in-Parliament, where 
legislation shaped the government's power and was supplemented 
through common law. 
Modern statutory iterations of the parens patriae power embody this 
spirit. Nevertheless, some states also still rely on their own common law 
as a source of this power. Additionally, Congress has also conferred fed-
eral statutory power to state attorneys general to sue on specific matters 
with a federal right of action. All of these sources of modern state parens 
patriae power are uncontroversial in areas where the historic police pow-
ers are assumed. There is one source, however, that does not fit this 
mold federal common law. 
The topology of sources of power can be illustrated as follows: 
1 2 
State Statutes State Common Law 
(conferring power on the state (conferring power on the state 
Attorney General) Attorney General) 
3 4 
Federal Statutes Federal Common Law 
(conferring power on the state (conferring power on the state 
Attorney General) Attorney General) 
Figure 1 
The top row represents sources in which we expect states to express 
their understanding of their own police powers. Indeed, the Framing Era 
cases showed states developing their own legislative and common law 
sources of authority in the early charity cases.362 Modern examples in-
clude state Unfair Competition Law and false advertising statutes. 363 
These reflect state laws about state powers in areas of state concern 
classic forms of law-making about areas constitutionally entrusted to the 
states. The bottom row of the chart is different. In the third box, Congress 
confers parens patriae powers upon state attorneys general through fed-
eral legislation with regard to particular subjects, in areas where federal 
and state power coexists (for example, in the Clayton Act of 1914).364 
Here, Congress creates a federal right to sue on an area within its Article 
I powers, but it assigns the right to sue to state attorneys general (i.e., 
361. See id. at 2331. 
362. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53. 
363. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CoDE § 17200 (prohibiting "unlawful, unfair or fraud-
ulent business act[s] or practice[s] and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertis-
ing"); id. § 1.7204 (giving Attorney General power to seek relief for such acts). 
364. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
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giving the states the opportunity to bring enforcement suits, should they 
choose to do so). There is nothing controversial about such an exercise of 
Article I power by Congress. All three of these sources of parens patriae 
power thus have a firm constitutional basis. 
The fourth box is historically troublesome. It purports to ground state 
parens patriae power in federal common law. Nineteenth-century federal 
cases such as Latter-Day Saints derived inherent powers from the federal 
general law that Erie abolished. The federal common law cases could be 
reformed simply by recognizing the states' historic police powers as the 
source of their parens patriae powers (as in the early environment and 
public health suits). This would imply, however, that Latter-Day Saints 
erred by assuming the federal government's parens patriae power was 
equivalent to that of the states'. 
If the history of parens patriae power in the early cases means anything 
for the vast modern practice of state involvement in mass tort cases, it 
ought to be read as reflecting the Framing Era's insight that common law 
police powers were subject to legislative constraints. Regardless whether 
the Statute of Elizabeth was or was not received by a particular state, its 
existence in England transformed ancient royal prerogatives into matters, 
subject to parliamentary sovereignty and laid the groundwork for the'. 
modern regulatory litigation scheme. State and federal legislative control-
over the executive exercise of public litigation still largely reflects a distri-
bution of power that comports in a very general sense with that structural 
heritage. However, the parens patriae power in all its iterations (statutory 
or common law) flows from the federalism built into our constitutional 
structure through the state police powers. The power has its firmest his-.. 
torical foundation where the states define it for themselves in the context 
of their own regulatory priorities. 
Reconstructing the foundation for modern parens patriae power as a 
function of state police power hints at why that doctrine ought not to be 
reduced to a mere analog of class actions under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23. Different values animate the two forms of litigation. The 
parens patriae doctrine lacks the constraints of Rule 23 because it reflects 
a fundamental form of state power in which those constraints simply have 
no historical, structural, or functional constitutional purpose. From the 
earliest days, the manner in which states exercise their police powers is 
flexible, open, and unconstrained by federal policy choices where there is 
no preemption. Indeed, the flexibility of the doctrine reflects the value of 
states as experimental innovators and independent regulators.3 65 The var-
iations in the expression, utilization, and extent of parens patriae among 
the several states creates space for local policy choices, experimentation, 
and varying expressions of enforcement priorities. For this reason, con-
verging class action rules and parens patriae would undercut the core val-
365. Constraining the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 303, at 224 (discuss-
ing "the Jeffersonian view of states as experimental actors capable of innovative policy 
approaches that can be implemented on a small scale to test their efficacy"). 
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ues underlying parens patriae as an expression of the police powers. 
Shoehorning parens patriae actions into the procedural mold of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure creates convenient symmetry for scholars 
and practitioners acculturated to Rule 23, but it eviscerates the historical 
relationship between parens patriae and the states' police powers. 
CONCLUSION 
The parens patriae doctrine has had the misfortune of being draped in 
the mythological trappings of royalty. The fiction of its English common 
law roots connecting it to the guardianship of "infants, idiots, and lunat-
ics" has led to confusion as to its contours and has sometimes made the 
precedent seem unhinged from the doctrine's purpose. 
Reconstructing the doctrine with an American history connected to the 
social compact of the Constitution and the states' historic police powers 
offers a better foundation for understanding its development, use, and 
limitations. The cases reflect the elasticity of the police powers and the 
evolution of the social mores regarding the role of the state in regulating 
economic interests. Situating the cases within such contemporary under-
standings of the police powers yields better predictability and explains 
the vast changes the doctrine has experienced in the last two decades. 
The murkiness of states' parens patriae powers can become transparent 
only when those powers have a historical and structural foundation. The 
aim of this Article was not to resolve all of the uncertainties that exist 
around the doctrine's contours. Rather, the Article's clarification of the 
history and purpose of the doctrine may open up space for future work 
that accomplishes this goal. 
